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ABSTRACT 
 
 During a time when ideological debates between Milton critics remained largely 
unresolved, Stanley Fish reconciled both sides of the “Milton Controversy” with 
Surprised by Sin, positing a theoretically sophisticated method that centers the poem’s 
meaning in the reader’s experience.  Christian and non-Christian critics became 
enfranchised in critical debate since their reactions, according to Fish, were valid and 
intended by Milton.  Borrowing his intentionalist approach from A.J.A. Waldock, Fish 
asserts his version of both author and text while implicitly employing a radically 
subjective hermeneutics.  Fish focuses on the multiple and contradictory linguistic 
meanings within Paradise Lost, locating the source of these contradictions in the human 
mind.  Viewing the problems of language as a result of human distance from the 
originator of language (the divine Logos), Fish’s Milton strongly draws on the 
Christianity of C.S Lewis.  In contrast to the methods of post-Derridean deconstruction, 
Fish’s Milton evinces the instability of language in order to strengthen the mind of his 
reader in a metaphysically Christian faith.  Over the course of four decades, Fish’s 
historically plausible critical framework became accepted as a valuable basis for critical 
practice.  However, his work also posed a challenge to later critics who disagreed with its 
ideological basis and its effect on critical method.  Critical response to Fish’s work often 
reflects an anxiety that recalls the theory of Harold Bloom’s Anxiety of Influence.  
Loosely following Bloom’s terms, I contend that critical reactions to Surprised by Sin 
reflect an ongoing anxiety over Fish’s effective mediation with Milton’s Paradise Lost. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION: AUTHORIAL INTANGLING 
 
Ideology and personal belief have often affected the debates of Milton criticism, 
from Samuel Johnson’s critical asides to T.S. Eliot’s frank expression of disdain.  
Distinctly ideological antagonism has characterized exchanges between the critic and the 
critic’s conception of Milton, and between critics themselves.  Likewise, as early as 
Richard Bentley’s 1732 edition of Paradise Lost, Milton’s readers have “made” and 
“remade” the author in their own images, through editing, criticism, and creative 
expression.1  Criticism in the twentieth century has continued these trends, with Eliot’s 
forcefully expressed aversion following that of Johnson, and William Empson’s modern 
sympathy with Satan in place of Percy Shelley’s Romantic reading.  While C.S. Lewis 
dissected Satan’s arguments in his paradigmatic Christian reading, maintaining the 
success of an orthodox Paradise Lost, critics like A.J.A. Waldock and Empson held that 
Milton (intentionally or not) failed in justifying the ways of his God to modern critics.  
An ideological rift divided the “Christian” critics from the non-Christian, Romantic and 
modernist critics. 
By 1967, there seemed to be two irreconcilable camps of Milton readers.  That 
year, however, Stanley Fish brought together both sides of the Milton Controversy with 
Surprised by Sin, his widely influential thesis that the meaning of Paradise Lost lies in 
                                                          
1 See William Kolbrener, Milton’s Warring Angels: A Study of Critical Engagements (1997).  Many studies 
have contributed to the Miltonic dialogue about how the idea of the author “Milton” has been envisioned in 
the responses of various readers—in particular, those readers who might seem to oppose the Christian, 
“patriarchal” view of Milton’s poetry.  For a fascinating study of how Milton’s early women readers found 
liberation in his texts, fashioning a version of Milton distinct from the misogynist view (what Woolf 
referred to as “Milton’s Bogey”) perpetuated by some modern feminist critics (see Sandra M. Gilbert, 
“Patriarchal Poetry and Women Readers: Reflections on Milton’s Bogey,” in PMLA 93, no. 3 [May 1978], 
368-82), see Joseph Wittreich, The Feminist Milton (1987), and for a positive view of George Eliot’s 
creative appropriation of Milton’s texts, see Anna K. Nardo, George Eliot’s Dialogue with John Milton 
(2003).  For a fine consideration of the Milton fashioned by Romantic writers, see Wittreich, The 
Romantics on Milton (1970). 
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the structure of the reader’s experience.  No longer was Milton either blind to or 
subversively complicit with Satan’s appeal.  Evil, the complexity of the natural world, 
and the imaginative power of the human mind, all had a place in the structure of Milton’s 
epic, consciously incorporated within Milton’s unifying, logocentric faith.  Fish’s 
brilliant meta-critical stance held that the negative reactions of Waldock and others were 
essential reading experiences and fully intended by the author as part of his strategy of 
guidance.  Beyond its meta-critical significance, Surprised by Sin engaged with theory, 
transgressing the New Critical bounds of Wimsatt and Beardsley’s “Intentional” and 
“Affective” fallacies with a revolutionary reader-centered approach.   
Indeed, though Surprised by Sin is not an explicitly theoretical work, it is based 
on certain assumptions that radically influenced the course of subsequent Milton 
criticism.  Fish assumes that the reader’s mind is the setting for the poem’s action, and 
thus the reader bears the primary function of bringing the text into being and bestowing 
meaning.  These are obvious indicators of reader-response theory.  In practice, however, 
Fish consistently refers to the text of the poem as an independent agent in the reading 
process, molding the reader’s consciousness to the end that Fish’s Milton envisions as 
original creator of the text.  In other terms, Fish asserts that a specific written work 
attributed to the author-function John Milton is intended to fashion a fundamentally 
Christian outlook in the very reader whose experience of being made “fit” constitutes the 
work’s fundamental meaning.  Within his complex hermeneutic system, Fish posits that 
Milton’s Paradise Lost compels the reader whose experience determines meaning to 
discover an undeterminable blockage: the log-in-the-eye that is the reader’s sinful nature.  
Your perspective determines meaning, Fish contends, but Milton illustrates a disjunction 
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between perspective and the truth of experience: between meaning and experience, theory 
and practice, lies the lived sin.   
While Fish originates the practice of reader-response criticism with Surprised by 
Sin,2 foreshadowing his 1972 theory in “Interpreting the Variorum,” Fish also effectively 
employs a traditional, almost New Critical notion that the text is in fact a stable and 
independent entity that can shape the reader’s experience.  Though this might seem to 
reflect an internal conflict, the work’s practical significance outweighs its apparent 
theoretical ambivalence.  Fish succeeds in the affirmative reception of his work.  As 
literary theory began to gain recognition in the late 1960s and early 1970s, Fish’s work 
helped to foster a critical environment for Milton studies in which ideological conflicts 
were largely averted in favor of other considerations.  Fish shapes a powerful vision of 
Milton’s “single-minded” logo-centrism which has influenced and continues to shape the 
terms of critical debate.  Surprised by Sin, as Fish himself writes in his 1997 preface, 
constitutes its own “structure of thought,” a challenge to which must take on the entire 
structure (de-centering the center established by Fish).  From this view, critical responses 
must posit their own structures within or in replacement of Fish’s structure, and this is 
what John Peter Rumrich, for instance, explicitly sets out to accomplish.  I do not intend 
                                                          
2 To preserve focus, I wish to distinguish Surprised by Sin from its author’s subsequent meta-theoretical 
reflections.  There appear to exist, in fact, theoretical contradictions within Fish’s own body of work, as 
some reviewers have noted.  In particular, though Fish’s later work might be in dialogue with the methods 
of historicism or “new historicism,” my focus is on the theory explicit (and implicit) primarily in the text of 
Surprised by Sin.  “Interpreting the Variorum,” Fish’s first major theoretical effort, declares the primacy of 
interpretation in the literary text.  The text, Fish writes, exists only in the mind of an infinite number of 
readers (beyond the “fit” reader of Surprised by Sin), filtered through the standards of various “interpretive 
communities.”  Fish’s later theory increasingly reflects the work of Derrida in post-structural hermeneutic 
suspension, though his most recent Milton criticism avoids such considerations.  In the acknowledgments 
page of How Milton Works (vii), Fish writes: “It may seem strange to acknowledge that one’s thoughts 
have not changed much in more than a quarter-century, but since one of my theses is that Milton himself 
changed very little, except to offer slight variations on a few obsessions that were his from the very 
beginning, I am comfortable with the notion that I keep discovering the same patterns and meanings over 
and over again.”  
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here to attempt a direct deconstruction of Surprised by Sin.  Although such an attempt 
represents a potentially rewarding critical project, my primary emphasis is on how Fish’s 
work is defined by and defines subsequent works of criticism.  In this project, however, I 
do not intend on limiting my scope to that of a demographic survey.  For a full 
consideration of the complexities of critical-theoretical influence, the currency of Fish’s 
ideas is entirely relevant, particularly as expressed in response to his own work.  In his 
preface to the 1997 edition of Surprised by Sin, Fish answers the challenges of Rumrich, 
conceding that the mere fact of his work’s influence does not render it beneficial, denying 
that “because my reading of Paradise Lost hovers over or underwrites operations in the 
field that it is either true or helpfully productive” (xiii).  In other words, Fish seems to 
acknowledge that the overbearing influence of his work, distinct from its recognized 
practical value, may have the potential to inhibit critical productivity.  As I have stressed, 
like any successful work of theory, Surprised by Sin is validated to the extent of its 
practical applicability, and this productivity is observable in the positive and negative 
critical attention it receives.   
One patent fact that yet needs reemphasis is that Surprised by Sin began and 
continues in the context of a vast and not entirely chartable community of critical work.  
This energetic “Milton Industry” greeted the year 1967 with volumes of published 
criticism, meta-critical analyses, tercentenary tributes, and symposia.  By no means was 
Miltonism becoming extinct.  The highly ideological focus of debates that characterized 
the “Milton Controversy” consistently received challenges from critics applying energy 
to heal the breach coincident with the three-hundredth anniversary of Paradise Lost’s 
first printing.  Christopher Ricks and others had by then countered the challenges to 
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Milton’s “Grand Style” posed by T.S. Eliot and F.R. Leavis.  Miltonists actively sought 
alternatives to the unceasing cycle of ideology.  No one, it seemed, could empirically 
persuade another to alter core beliefs.  1967 was a fitting time for Fish’s unique fusion of 
theory and critical practice.  As Fish writes in his 1997 preface, “The advantage of this 
thesis, at least with respect to what was then called the ‘Milton Controversy,’ is that it 
achieved the full enfranchisement of all combatants; everyone is partly right and 
everyone’s perspective is necessary to the poem’s larger strategy” (x-xi).  Thus, as 
Rumrich writes, “Surprised by Sin initiated a confederation of factions in Milton studies 
by putting an apparently destabilizing hermeneutics to work for traditionalist interests” 
(4).   
While some critics, from William Empson to William Kerrigan, attempt to adapt 
Milton’s writings to modern paradigms and patterns of understanding, Fish chooses the 
reverse, holding the modern perspective in suspension as subjectively valid.  He 
challenges Waldock’s standing narrative criticisms, referring, for instance, to Wayne 
Booth’s The Rhetoric of Fiction in his critique of Waldock’s “modern” perspective on 
epic narrative.  Fish’s response was timely, and his evidence for the currency of the 
notion of reader-temptation in Milton’s time is plausible, as Joseph Wittreich has 
corroborated, for example (Visionary Poetics 35).  However, Fish was not alone in his 
attempt to answer “anti-Miltonist” critiques, nor was he alone in positing an historical 
context for interpretation.  As Patrick Murray remarks in his 1967 critical survey, 
“Milton’s apologists pleaded continually that the reader should take into account the 
conventions of seventeenth-century thought, the conventions governing the style and 
diction of epic poetry, and the necessary differences between epic verse and lyrical and 
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dramatic verse” (128-29).  What distinguishes Fish’s approach, in part, is the interaction 
of its historical and theological considerations with its theoretical stance. 3 The clarity of 
his presentation and the relative inviolability of his theory provide particularly powerful 
and stable points-of-reference for the Miltonist.   
Fish’s approach follows the historical emphasis of Empson, stressing both 
Milton’s own religious writings and the writings of his contemporaries.  Though Fish’s 
Milton also resists the epistemic substitution, or deconstruction, inherent in 
poststructuralist developments in literary theory, his relationship with such theorists is 
complex.  Indeed, for Fish, Milton represents an open author-function for which Fish 
substitutes his own center (a center that is consistent with certain common threads of 
critical interpretation).  Surprised by Sin set its own standard of evaluation, exclusive to 
the standards of other theorists, in the same manner that Harold Bloom establishes his 
own standard of poetic value in The Anxiety of Influence, acknowledging the potential 
danger of “reduction,” while naturally claiming the greater usefulness of his method over 
others.  In effect, Bloom and Fish assert a similar and complementary type of authority in 
the critical realm.  As a literary-critical figure, Fish shadows subsequent critics and 
theorists as the subjectively secure bearer of poetic meaning, a role that Bloom might 
term the “covering cherub” of Milton.   
From his plausible presentation and almost New Critical close readings, Fish the 
theorist seems to say to his readers and future critics: “Your interpretation is equally valid 
                                                          
3 Fish cites readings that “anticipate” his own (Surprised 2, n.1): in particular, Anne Ferry, Milton’s Epic 
Voice: The Narrator in “Paradise Lost” (1963); Joseph Summers, The Muse’s Method (1962).  Some 
representative works emphasizing reader-education and historical context that precede Surprised by Sin 
include:  Douglas Bush, Paradise Lost in Our Time (1957 [c1945]); C.S. Lewis, A Preface to “Paradise 
Lost” (1959); Balachandra Rajan, Paradise Lost and the Seventeenth-Century Reader (1948); Charles 
Williams, The English Poetic Mind (1963); B.A. Wright, Milton’s Paradise Lost (1962).  Murray also links 
the work of E.M.W. Tillyard and Sir Herbert Grierson with the “historical defense” of Milton (130). 
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inasmuch as each interpretation bears essential validity, but it may or may not function as 
effectively as my own structure of thought.”  Fish himself asks the reader in his 1997 
preface, “see if this way of reading makes better sense of the poem than the way of 
reading (and there always has to be one) within which you were proceeding before” (xiv).  
Fish rests “[his] case on the decision of [his] peers as to whether or not the change [he] 
urged was beneficial” (xiv).  The question of whether Fish’s theory limits or enables 
productive Milton scholarship is for Miltonists to answer.  Every proposed theory faces 
the same pitfall, as Harold Bloom contends, and the issue at stake “is reduction and how 
to avoid it.  Rhetorical, Aristotelian, phenomenological, and structuralist criticisms all 
reduce, whether to images, ideas, given things, or phonemes.  Moral and other blatant 
philosophical or psychological criticisms all reduce to rival conceptualizations” (94).  
Fish’s criticism of Milton certainly appears reductive on a moral level (“Doctrine, 
reproof, correction, instruction. Milton could not have wished for higher praise, and he 
should not be judged by a lesser standard” [Surprised 56]), though his application could 
be seen on a practical level to embody the essence of Bloom’s theory.  According to 
Bloom, his school of critics reduces a poem, “if at all…to another poem.  The meaning of 
a poem can only be another poem” (94).  To the extent that Surprised by Sin represents 
Fish’s own (re)writing of Milton, it would certainly follow Bloom’s definition of a poem.   
As Milton criticism and its meta-critical observers have taught me, there is no 
such thing as a truly objective reading.  My own is no different, and consequently a 
statement of my own position is expedient, though not central to my forthcoming 
argument.  Like many others, I find that Surprised by Sin has enhanced my enjoyment 
and consideration of Paradise Lost.  The imaginative leap into Fish’s brilliantly 
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articulated thought-structure is not impossible in my mind, despite what other modern or 
postmodern thinkers might assert.  In particular, I find his defusing of the problem posed 
by Empson’s God compelling, though perhaps not wholly beneficial to the dynamic of 
Milton criticism.  In this vein, I view Fish’s self-conscious assertion of Milton’s authorial 
intention as setting a positive trend.  So much energy has been spent in fruitless debate 
between versions of Milton that are as irreconcilable as their proponents’ ideologies.  
Though I cannot imagine anyone actually “transcending” ideology, to me Fish’s approach 
mitigates arguments among Miltonists that might otherwise resemble mere debates over 
the viability of Christianity.   
As numerous critics have noted in complaint or approval, Fish’s God is not on 
trial.  For Fish’s Milton, the verb “justify” in the opening invocation acquires the 
signification, “to set in order” or “align” two objects in parallel, so that the “ways of 
God” become recognizable and reconciled to (rather than defended in the terms of) the 
interpretations of men.4  The critical expectation for theodicy or trial under an 
enlightened jury thus becomes a question of refocusing human consciousness itself; in 
John P. Rumrich’s formulation, Fish’s Paradise Lost represents an “ironic theodicy” 
(“Uninventing Milton 257).  Despite my affinity for the genius of Fish’s thesis, however, 
I do not consider it the “only way to read Milton,” though the imaginative plausibility of 
Fish’s historically referenced construction of Milton is its great strength.  My interest 
tends toward the rigor and vigor of earlier, more ideologically conscious debates recalled 
by Rumrich, though perhaps I would avoid associating Milton excessively and 
                                                          
4 Oxford English Dictionary, 2d ed., s.v. “justify.”  The OED lists reference under the definition, “To make 
exact; to fit or arrange exactly,” as early as 1551.  However, this “pun” is primarily for my own rhetorical 
emphasis, rather than a suggested addition to LeComte’s dictionary of Miltonic puns. 
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unrealistically with modern or postmodern affinities.  Certainly, there exists no dearth of 
alternative versions of Milton in a time when theory has become the subject of theory.   
Over the course of my study, I imply an opposition between subjectivist and 
objectivist approaches to literary criticism.  This implication merits some clarification.  
The objectivist position I associate in part with New Critics, formalists, and other schools 
that consider the literary text as a relatively stable entity, capable of generating common 
reactions among human beings reasonably familiar with its language and cultural 
referents (though I acknowledge the complexities of these very criteria).  For objectivists 
the literary text possesses inherent, at times even religious qualities, either of itself or as 
the product of a more-or-less definite author-figure (human or divine).  In contrast, 
subjectivist critics view the text as an unstable and problematic conglomeration of 
assumptions and inferences.  Represented largely by poststructuralist criticism, 
subjectivists consider the realm of language as uncertain as that of human nature, as 
unknowable as the unity of the author’s identity.  There is no sacred text; no author is 
sacred.  Conjectures about meaning are always qualified by the subjectivity of the critic 
and submitted to other critics in an ongoing discourse.  What divides subjectivism from 
objectivism, in part, is its denial of a Logos, a concept of divinity that unifies textual 
signifier with a transcendent source of significance.  Absent the metaphysical certainty of 
a concept of Logos—which involves a common, transcendent origin of and purpose for 
humanity—exemplified in the Christian religious canon, textual meaning originates in the 
human mind, subjectively. 
With Surprised by Sin, Fish unites elements of subjectivist and objectivist 
approaches in what would seem an unstable harmony.  Locating textual meaning in the 
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reader’s mind, Fish also professes critical faith in the logocentric metaphysical certainty 
of author and text.  Milton’s God is real in the critical context of Surprised by Sin.  The 
reader is free to accept or deny the omnipotence and omnipresence of this deity; as Fish 
says, both approaches are valid and intended.  However, if you accept Fish’s terms as 
Milton’s, the experience of Paradise Lost challenges your metaphysical view of earthly 
(textual and physical) realities.  Words for Fish’s Milton lose meaning (signifiers become 
detached from signified) as humanity forgets the pervasive presence of God, the origin of 
language (and goodness).  While in his manner Fish asserts the subjectivity of literary 
meaning, this assertion does not preclude his approach to Milton.  His thesis asserts that 
though the reader’s perceptual experience determines meaning, the reader’s perception is 
inherently flawed.  The Fall in Fish’s Paradise Lost represents a rupture between the 
subjective and objective.  Fallen language, the inaccessibility of literary meaning, is a 
symptom of this rift.  Through his intentionalist approach, Fish portrays a Milton aware 
of the problems of subjectivity, a Milton who warns his readers not to place faith in 
human language as a reliable mediator for transcendent reality.  The problems that face 
both Fish’s Milton and Fish as literary mediator are the problems of poststructural 
relativity; the difference is that Fish’s Milton declares faith in a unifying, if linguistically 
distant, center of reality. 
As a subjective literary interpreter, the critic must declare faith in some source of 
meaning.  To loosely adapt a term from Derrida, the critic “substitutes” his own center of 
significance as a profession of critical faith.  One critic might posit Satan as the center of 
textual meaning in Paradise Lost, praising the achievement of a gap between signifier 
and significance and locating the poet’s power in that gap.  Another critic, like Fish, 
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could just as easily substitute Milton’s God as the poem’s center, reading the poet’s 
power in his declared affiliation with the deity.  This substitution (profession of faith) 
does not alter reality; rather, it alters the critic’s own perception along with that of those 
who adhere to his interpretation.  With Surprised by Sin, Fish in effect contributes to an 
ongoing exchange or discourse of literary substitutions.  He asserts his view of intentional 
textual meaning while realizing that in practice not every reader shares the same vision.  
However, Fish’s vision has in fact influenced the interpretations of many of Milton’s 
readers.  Anxiety and acclaim characterize the critical responses to the overwhelming 
influence of Fish’s version of Milton’s text.     
Since my critical subject is itself a critical work, I am fully aware of the pitfall 
(temptation), warned against by Christopher Hill, of focusing dryly on “the views of 
Professor Blank on the views of Professor Schrank on the views of Professor Rank on 
what Milton may or may not have written” (Milton and the English Revolution 3).  
However, part of my aim is to depict trends toward and against such circularity within 
criticism, with Stanley Fish perhaps as a Professor Rank who arguably mediates closely 
with the primary object of criticism: Paradise Lost.  I do not intend to present an 
inclusive survey of the entire body of Milton criticism since 1967, but rather to highlight 
some illustrative points and counterpoints of articulate critics, both established and less-
established.  Employing Bloom’s theoretical framework as a powerful though limited 
tool, I will survey the various patterns in which critics either “transume” (appropriate for 
themselves) or revise Fish’s thesis, or altogether challenge its structural center which 
originates in the reader who is Fish. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE READER IN SURPRISED BY SIN 
The pervasive critical influence of Surprised by Sin has found expression in the 
writings of Miltonists for more than three decades since its publication.  Perhaps the best 
recent articulator of this influence is John Peter Rumrich, who, in his 1996 critical study, 
laments that “Fish’s seminal study…is still basic to our contemporary understanding of 
Milton’s works” (Milton Unbound 2).  In Rumrich’s assessment, “Fish inaugurated a 
period in Milton criticism analogous to what Kuhn describes as ‘normal science,’ a 
condition in which practitioners labor to extend and deepen a working paradigm rather 
than rehash fundamental issues that it resolved” (4).  It is easy to be reductive in 
generalizing about these trends in criticism, and critical influence is as resistant to 
measure as any other type of literary exchange.  Though no criticism occurs in a vacuum, 
similar conclusions and theories can easily be embraced by separate critics completely 
unconscious of their shared “interpretive community.”5  No Fish school of criticism 
exists specifically devoted to Surprised by Sin.  However, the consistent publication of 
works overtly or implicitly aligned with his method, as well as the recurring publication 
of challenges to his “hegemony,” strongly indicates the endurance of his work as a 
critical touchstone among Miltonists.  The validation of Fish’s thesis, as he has pointed 
out, lies in the affirming response of his readers; these educated and outspoken readers 
best reflect the ripples of influence in both directions.  Indeed, the reader posited in 
Surprised by Sin, corrigible or not, generates a response that defines both her own 
experience and the effective meaning of the text itself.   
                                                          
5 Fish’s phrase, from “Interpreting the Variorum.”  
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There is little need here for a critical defense of Fish’s method, since in his 1997 
preface Fish himself provides such a defense as well as an expansive explanation of his 
method, addressing what I have found to be the most sustained critiques of his 
challengers.6  In terms of critical history, the provocative work of John Peter Rumrich 
precedes me in the task of mapping out patterns of response to Surprised by Sin.  
Likewise, William Kolbrener presents an insightful, overarching view of critical trends.7  
However, a brief survey and close reading of patterns of critical response, positive and 
negative, from the year of initial publication, will help illustrate the nature of Fish’s 
influence.   
While these patterns of response may not demonstrate the unquestioned 
ascendance of what Rumrich calls the Kuhnian paradigm of “normal science” in Milton 
studies, they certainly demonstrate a continued engagement with Fish in published Milton 
scholarship.  Most references to Surprised by Sin, positive and negative, allude to its 
“general acceptance” in the community.  For critics of Fish, such as Rumrich and even 
Kolbrener, this overbearing influence shadows over (sets the terms of) even its attempted 
challengers.  In selecting my sources, I have generally found that critical prefaces and 
introductions provide the most cogent and revealing insights into authorial method, 
though sections or chapters that address significant topics in relation to Surprised by Sin 
also lend insight.  The following four sections are titled in reference to critical 
observations from Fish and his critics relating to or expressed during the period 
                                                          
6 Over the course of my study, I will address relevant statements from Fish’s defense in his 1997 preface, in 
context with other critical responses to Surprised by Sin.  Although Fish is among the best interpreters of 
Fish, I intend to read this preface primarily as an extrinsic comment upon his work, rather than as a gloss 
upon its meaning which I am considering in terms of critical response and representation. 
7 Kolbrener’s historiographical approach, while it presents compelling patterns of long-standing trends in 
Milton criticism, bears only an indirect relation to my own purposes and approach.  
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designated, though the implications of a clear progression are of course illusory.  In 
preface, let me say that I harbor the highest respect for the scholars from whose opinions 
I have borrowed below.  Both those who find value in Fish’s thesis and those bold 
enough to declare independence have contributed greatly to the Milton community.  
Necessities of space and time sometimes require condensing of their larger arguments.  In 
commenting on their work I acknowledge only one aspect of the value of their 
contributions. 
As in the critical overviews fashioned by Rumrich and Kolbrener, my own survey 
faces a challenge of focus; it is of course difficult to chart a narrow course through the 
wildly blossoming borders of critical work on Milton.  For the purposes of this study, 
response to Fish falls into four categories.  The first accepts Fish’s thesis overtly or 
implicitly, neither challenging nor adapting it but accepting it as a foundational premise 
for critical work.  The second adapts Fish’s method to its own critical terms, adopting the 
intentional approach but reformulating or translating Milton’s aim in more secular or 
literary terms.  The third response is that of a direct challenge, attempting to disestablish 
its perceived hegemony, generally by emphasizing its negative effect on critical 
production.  The fourth and final pattern of response is that of conspicuous neglect; these 
critics write without accepting or refuting Fish’s approach.  Rather, their silence often 
speaks an attempt to quietly shift the focus of critical production.  After all, the most 
effective way to disestablish Fish’s reading is to provide a plausible and practically 
applicable alternative.  Several reviewers that respond to the influence of Fish’s work are 
not Miltonists themselves and thus fall outside of these four categories.  In order to retain 
a sense of sequence in critical response, I have chosen to situate these categories within a 
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chronological framework.  Although decades are ultimately inadequate divisions, the 
chronological progression I have chosen reflects the responsive movements of ongoing 
critical dialogue. 
(i) REFOCUSSING (1967-1977) 
The years immediately following the publication of Surprised by Sin find both 
implicit and explicit acknowledgments of the work’s influence.  As Stanley Fish contends 
in his 1997 preface, from its introduction, his thesis was “almost immediately influential” 
(xi).  Responses to his work among published criticism during the early years are less 
explicit though not less significant.  The immediacy of recognition, even in books 
published near the time of Surprised by Sin whose manuscripts might easily have been 
composed before its publication, reflects its early critical relevance.    
Critical response during this period often follows the first pattern of response, 
acknowledging and accepting Fish’s approach.  John Steadman, for instance, aligns 
himself with Fish’s emphasis on the seventeenth-century context in his 1968 collection of 
essays, Milton’s Epic Characters (13).  Likewise, the work of Balachandra Rajan tends to 
harmonize with the emphases of Surprised by Sin; indeed, Rajan’s “Paradise Lost” and 
the Seventeenth-Century Reader, published in 1948, anticipates Fish’s approach.  The 
Lofty Rhyme, published in 1970, reflects a similar pedagogical and theoretical view in 
which the poetry makes “demands” on the reader, intentionally eliciting conflicted 
responses and requiring choice (72-74).  Rajan briefly acknowledges the parallels 
between his own thought (in present and earlier work) and Fish’s thesis (165), without 
expressing either anxiety or adherence.   
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The clarity with which Fish presents a Lewisite version of Milton prompted one 
early reviewer to remark, perhaps ironically, that “Mr. Fish himself is surely an orthodox 
traditional Christian” (Turner 422).  The same reviewer, W. Arthur Turner, foretells that 
this book “will annoy many readers bred in the atmosphere of atheism and empiricism” 
(420).  “But,” he continues, “as Mr. Fish says, ‘Milton did not write for the atheist’ 
(Surprised by Sin 44) …It was for such [orthodox traditional Christians] that Paradise 
Lost was written.  Where this leaves the anti-Miltonists is beyond the province of this 
reviewer” (Turner 422).  These “anti-Miltonists” who do not share the metaphysical 
certainties of Fish’s Milton, then, will at the least have difficulty finding Milton 
rewarding, as Turner tersely speculates.  Even outside the community of Milton scholars, 
the influence of Fish’s work is recognized early on, as this 1968 Renaissance Quarterly 
review evinces.   
Where Turner’s review hints at the rippling influence of Fish’s thesis beyond the 
Milton community, forthcoming works on Milton further demonstrate this influence by 
incorporating Fish’s premises.  For instance, in 1973, Leslie Brisman adapts a central 
aspect of Fish’s thesis in the title of his study, Milton’s Poetry of Choice.  In a trend of 
appropriation displayed by many later critics, Brisman neatly restates and incorporates 
Fish’s experientially based thesis, asserting that, “For Milton, the awareness of fall is 
always of what has passed; protagonist and reader are surprised by sin that is already 
committed” (111).  Brisman approvingly cites Fish’s comment on the poem’s accusatory 
tone—“you have made a mistake, just as I knew you would” (Surprised 9)—and, she 
writes, “This sense of closure characterizes the mode of narrative throughout” (Brisman 
112):  we readers, again, realize our error.  Later critics follow this first pattern of 
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response, often exploring variations on Fish’s themes or close textual analyses that tend 
to complement Fish’s central contentions. 
While critics during the first decade pay tribute to or adopt Fish’s approach, some 
follow the fourth pattern of response, writing without expressing any sense of anxiety at 
the direction of the larger interpretive community.  Following the winds of structuralist 
and emerging post-structuralist theory and anticipating the 1983 work of Herman 
Rapaport,8 Donald F. Bouchard avoids Fish’s hermeneutics altogether.  Instead, 
Bouchard presents an early example of theoretically conscious Milton criticism, 
emphasizing the “labyrinthine” qualities of Milton’s poetry.  In his 1974 study, Milton: A 
Structural Reading, Bouchard offers an “approach to Milton through the methods of 
French ‘Structuralism’” (i).  Unlike later critics, however, Bouchard displays few signs of 
anxiety or isolation among this interpretive community, citing Fish’s analyses of passages 
in passing without any reference to accepting or denying Fish’s central thesis (83).  
Rather, Bouchard cites both the work of Derrida and that of structuralists such as Lévi-
Strauss to illuminate his textual analysis of Paradise Lost.  Apart from the work of 
Rapaport, however, Bouchard’s work appears to have had little influence on later Milton 
criticism. 
Following this fourth pattern from a different, Marxist-oriented school of 
criticism, in 1977, Christopher Hill shifts critical emphasis toward a broader historical 
view, asserting that Milton (the author and man) “cannot reasonably be claimed as 
‘orthodox’” (Milton and the English Revolution 3).  Without citing Fish directly, Hill 
decries the Lewisite trend, which Fish explicitly perpetuates, of appropriating Milton for 
                                                          
8 In his own work, Rapaport acknowledges Bouchard as his predecessor (Milton and the Postmodern 66, 
188). 
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orthodoxy.  Milton, he writes, “needs to be defended from his defenders almost more 
than from the declining band of his enemies” (7).  Like Fish, Hill stresses historical 
context; yet Hill’s historical emphasis is distinct from Fish’s.  Where Fish, in 
emphasizing Milton’s Christian “single-mindedness,” largely dissociates his Milton from 
the apparent contradictions of his various writings, Hill attempts to reunite studies of 
Milton’s poetry with the problematic revolutionary allegiances latent in his prose.  “By 
replacing Milton in history,” Hill contends, “we shall be able to catch in his writings 
echoes of discussions and controversies which meant much to him and to those for whom 
he wrote, but which lose this resonance when they are treated in isolation” (7).   
Reflecting a Marxist politico-historical perspective, Hill downplays the conflict 
between Milton’s revolutionary politics and his theological grounding.  The “process of 
internalizing God’s will, and externalizing the Satanic…does not necessarily go with 
disillusionment or abandonment of political struggle” (389).  Though he aligns himself 
with the “heretical” version of Milton, Hill nonetheless maintains an ideological 
continuity in Milton’s thought.  Thus, William Kolbrener writes in 1996, Hill participates 
in a critical exchange that maintains contradictory versions of the poet, alternate 
orthodoxies that do not allow for variation or “polyvalence” in Milton’s own ideas.  In 
Kolbrener’s scheme, Hill takes the “satanic” side, defining his terms against those of Fish 
and his camp of “angelic” critics though failing to address Fish’s work directly.  Indeed, 
Hill appears to have consulted with Fish personally, alluding in various footnotes to his 
discussions with the author of Surprised by Sin.  However, as an alternate reader of 
Milton, Hill asserts his interpretation in his own terms.  In presenting his alternative, Hill 
makes no direct challenge to Surprised by Sin.  Rather, to some extent, Hill’s ideological 
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affinity for the revolutionary Milton underlies his lack of reference to Fish’s work, in a 
way similar to Eliot’s ideologically driven attempts to focus critical attention away from 
Milton’s poetry.  Like Empson and other critics, Hill sees little use in the critical 
orthodoxies represented by Fish’s revision of Lewis’s Christian Milton.  Thus, Hill 
indirectly affirms the influence of Surprised by Sin, referring to personal conversations 
with Fish yet conspicuously avoiding acknowledgment of the significance of Fish’s 
thesis. 
(ii) WIELDING THE SWORD OF GOD (1977-1987) 
 
During this span, the influence of Surprised by Sin finds expression in the third 
pattern of response: articulate critiques of Fish’s hegemony.  Responses in this decade 
become more direct and sustained, particularly in strongly worded review articles such as 
Lucy Newlyn’s.  Echoing the language of Christopher Hill, William Cain further 
critiques the course of the “Milton Industry” which he believes has abandoned advances 
in critical theory.  Ideological and theoretical awareness become common preoccupations 
in the response to Fish’s Milton during this decade.  Joseph Wittreich, while conceding 
the usefulness of Fish’s thesis in his early work, later challenges from a feminist 
perspective the oppressive traditionalism in Milton studies perpetuated by Fish’s 
hegemony.  Catherine Belsey likewise takes issue with the lack of ideological 
consciousness in Fish’s approach.  During this decade, the anxiety and strength of 
negative reactions further illustrate the continuing influence of Surprised by Sin.  
Opposing critics decry Fish’s influence reflected in the work of their colleagues—such as 
Robert Crosman’s secularized translation of Fish’s ethical transformation.  As Newlyn 
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will observe, books on Milton during this time often follow the first and second patterns 
of response: variations on and reformulations of Fish’s thesis. 
Joseph Wittreich’s Visionary Poetics, published in 1979, supports Newlyn’s 
contention.  Here, Wittreich adapts Fish’s thesis to his own model, contending that the 
prophet’s (Milton’s) struggle for expression becomes transferred to his audience’s 
struggle for interpretation (“apprehension”), in the form of “mental exercise” through 
“reader harassment” (35).  In an observation that recalls at once the writings of William 
Blake and the theory of Bloom, Wittreich continues that, “Just as the prophet requires an 
interpreting angel…so too does his audience” (35).  Interestingly, after announcing his 
own affinity with Fish’s thesis, Wittreich goes on to introduce the image of “an 
interpreting angel.”  Though he does not apply this image to Fish, Wittreich nonetheless 
summons a powerful association that illuminates his own response and that of many other 
critics.  In his later feminist criticism, Wittreich reacts against the power of this 
“interpreting angel,” criticizing Fish’s (and Bloom’s) “establishmentarian” Milton.  In 
Visionary Poetics, however, he follows the first pattern of response and aligns his critical 
work with Fish’s thesis.   
Fronting a trend of direct confrontation, the third pattern of response, Catherine 
Belsey reacts strongly against Fish’s influence in her 1980 study, Critical Practice.  
Belsey presents one of the strongest challenges to the theoretical base of Surprised by 
Sin.  In particular, she criticizes the theory expressed in Surprised by Sin and further 
articulated in Fish’s 1972 theoretical discussion of the reader’s “experience of 
seventeenth-century literature” in Self-Consuming Artifacts (32).  Anticipating later 
critiques, Belsey states that Fish’s approach is necessarily limiting and insulated from 
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historical and ideological consciousness (34).  Belsey writes that Fish’s theory contrasts 
with Noam Chomsky’s “linguistic competence,” which allows for broader interpretive 
possibility: “At the level of deep structure (the set of semantically important relationships 
within a sentence), there is a universal grammar, common to all languages, and 
corresponding to innate mechanisms shared by all human beings” (34).  Fish’s theory, 
however, “operates at the level of surface structure and depends specifically on the 
experience of reading that has permitted the internalization of the conventions which 
characterize particular literary discourses” (34).  Belsey targets the lack of consciousness 
in Fish’s description of the “experience” that determines textual meaning.  For Fish, 
Belsey writes,  
There is no recognition that experience is in any sense ideologically or 
discursively constructed. Thus, though his whole enterprise is based on the 
belief that individual literary experiences are the product of individual 
discourses, Fish makes no attempt to account in theoretical terms for the 
relationship between experience and language, ideology and history. As a 
result, what he practices is on the whole a sophisticated form of New 
Criticism, with concessions to literary history and the addition of a reader 
whose presence creates more theoretical problems than it solves. (34) 
 
Here, Belsey laments what she sees as a lack of ideological consciousness in Fish’s 
method.  Directly confronting Fish’s metaphysical assertion of meaning, Belsey contends 
that “What is realized…in the verbal and metrical patterns of Paradise Lost, is…not the 
presence of god but the triumphant presence of the signifier” (43).  Further, she contends, 
each signifier that Milton employs “is a signifier whose signified is another text” (41).  
While Belsey observes similar deconstructive language patterns in Milton’s poem, she 
places critical emphasis on the modern (or postmodern) perspective that Fish distills from 
his consideration of Milton.  
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In his 1997 preface, Fish responds to Belsey’s contention that meaning is 
indeterminate, clarifying his own stance.  According to Fish, his work adheres to her idea 
of the “textuality of truth,” though he takes it to mean that “although truth is asserted to 
be independent of any representation of it, it is only in assertions and representations that 
the truth comes to us” (xl).  Fish writes, “To say that textuality or mediation is an 
inescapable ingredient of human (and angelic) knowledge is not to deny the singleness of 
truth, but to specify the conditions under which it must be chosen, conditions that always 
fall short of what would be the case if the shape of truth were self-evident and 
indisputable” (xlii).  Fish also takes issue with Belsey’s contention that Paradise Lost is 
“two texts in one,” “an absolutist poem…and a humanist narrative” (Belsey 60).  “There 
is no ‘absolutist poem,’” he writes, and  
if there were, interpretations both inside it (like Satan’s) and 
outside it (like Belsey’s) would be impossible.  There is instead a poem 
that offers to already free subjects a choice between believing in (styling) 
a universe presided over by a generative and omniscient deity or a 
universe presided over by chance, indeterminacy, opportunistic self-
creation and the accidents of time. (xlv) 
 
Of course, though Fish’s later response clarifies the limitations and the freedom of the 
theoretical basis of his thesis, Fish responds to Belsey’s argument seventeen years later.  
Thus Fish implies that, among the responses of others, the contentions of Belsey 
remained salient for almost two decades.  Of course, as the response of later critics 
reveals, Belsey does not thoroughly derail Fish’s thesis.  Rather, in the manner of the 
third pattern, her reaction both defies and reflects the influence of Fish’s study on critical 
method. 
In critical practice during this span of time, Surprised by Sin seems to represent 
the product of an “interpreting angel,” informing and providing a framework for critical 
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practice.  Beyond the simple acknowledgment expressed by Wittreich in 1979, Robert 
Crosman finds in Fish a critical touchstone for his 1980 study, Reading “Paradise Lost.”  
Crosman emphasizes his debt to Fish in a revealing introduction, writing that “Surprised 
by Sin is in my opinion the best book ever written on Paradise Lost and has helped me 
better than any other to understand and to enjoy Milton’s poem” (13).  Following the 
second pattern of response, adaptation and translation, Crosman’s work could be seen as 
a secularizing revision of Fish’s central terminology.  After stating Fish’s contribution to 
his “enjoyment” of the poem, Crosman continues that “Fish’s Puritan ‘reader’ has 
annoyed many of his own readers,” and cites William Kerrigan’s joke that “Fish’s reader 
has ‘a remarkable appetite for being duped’” (13).  Crosman also adopts Peter Berek’s 
complaint that it is implausible to imagine an authentic seventeenth-century response that 
follows Fish’s prescription of being “confused…[and] unwilling or unable to parse out 
the plain sense of the poet’s syntax,” and subsequently becoming “so sophisticated,” 
reviewing the poem “again as though he were preparing for a Ph.D. examination” (14).    
Crosman diverges “sharply” from Fish’s argument “in the matter of an historic 
reader” (14).  “In my view,” he writes, this invented reader “is not only fallacious but, in 
its effect on many modern readers, unfortunate, since it asks us to inhibit our own 
responses in favor of certain official or objective responses” (14, italics mine).  Recalling 
the ideological differences expressed by other critics, Crosman writes that “Fish’s historic 
reader is as dead as the spiritual tradition from which he was exhumed” (14).  Crosman 
implies that Fish’s thesis potentially validates the modernist commonplace that Paradise 
Lost is a “monument to dead ideas,” writing that, “To the extent that he requires a 
response that modern readers (Christian and non-Christian alike) neither have 
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spontaneously nor would wish to have, Fish has only managed to suggest with his model 
of the reader that Paradise Lost is a dead text” (14).  Yet, though Crosman takes issue 
with Fish’s approach, he nonetheless follows the second pattern of response, adapting 
Fish’s method to his own ends. 
Instead of reconstructing a monument to dead ideas, Crosman posits a translation 
of Fish’s theological terms into language more relevant to the enlightened modern reader.  
Challenging Fish’s version of the “fit reader,” Crosman contends that, “Even if there 
were such a thing as the reader, it is hard to see that his responses, any more than 
authorial intention, should govern the responses of actual readers” (14).  Crosman, 
however, unintentionally arrives at the significance of Fish’s theoretical strategy by 
noting the limitations of “reader-response” approaches.  Viewing Fish’s subjective 
approach as a limitation, Crosman observes, “if response is a key aspect of literary 
experience but is inescapably subjective, then criticism can have nothing to say about 
it…If every reader’s response is valid, then there is apparently nothing for the critic to 
do” (14).   
As a poststructuralist like Derrida might respond, if every response is valid, then 
for Fish there is everything for the critic to do.  It is in this very uncertainty (this 
unoccupied center) that Fish finds the space for his plausible doctrinal reading of the 
poem:  If all readings are equally valid, his own represents not the “average” or even the 
“intended” reader.  It represents an assertion of Fish’s own reading, the reader fashioned 
in Fish’s own response, submitted to other similarly subjective readers for approval or 
rejection.  Fish seems to address his readers, asserting, “every other approach is valid, but 
see if mine works best for you in practice.”  As Fish observes in his 1997 preface, the 
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success of his thesis is not verified by external empirical evidence; it is measured in the 
response of his readers, the acceptance of an interpretive community. 
Responding to the influence strongly reflected during this decade by Crosman and 
others, William E. Cain critiques the direction of Milton studies under what he perceives 
to be the unhealthy reign of Fish.  A non-Miltonist, Cain nonetheless perceives the 
influence of Fish’s work.  Without concluding that Fish himself presents a theoretically 
savvy reading, Cain implies that Surprised by Sin has acted as an effective “covering 
cherub” to Milton critics, precluding alternate readings.  In his 1981 review of six 
contemporary book-length studies of Milton criticism, Cain decries the state of the 
“Milton industry,” lamenting that “almost none of the writers seems aware of the work in 
literary theory and methodology that has been produced in the past two decades.  Barthes, 
Foucault, Derrida, Althusser, Lacan, Girard—these figures and others are conspicuously 
absent” (1121).9  This “dismaying state of Milton criticism,” he writes, is due to the 
influence of Surprised by Sin and the response to Waldock, from whom Fish takes his 
own influence and whose arguments he answers (1122).  However, Cain writes, 
“Whereas Waldock objected to the deployment of doctrine in the poem, Fish embraces it” 
(1123).  Cain implies that the theoretical naivety that he perceives reflects a 
preoccupation with the Christian assumptions of Fish’s Milton.   Critics make only 
“minor adjustments” to Fish’s answers to the “familiar questions”: “Is there a separation 
between narrative and doctrine? What is Milton’s intention and what does he actually 
achieve?  What is (or should be) the response of the reader” (1124).  As Rumrich will 
                                                          
9 The works reviewed by Cain are: Robert Crosman, Reading Paradise Lost (1980); James A. Freeman, 
Milton and the Martial Muse (1980); Murray Roston, Milton and the Baroque (1980); Roland Mushat Frye, 
Milton’s Imagery and the Visual Arts (1978); Edward W. Tayler, Milton’s Poetry (1979); G.K. Hunter, 
Paradise Lost (1980). 
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later restate, Cain writes that the very “form of the debate” is generally determined by 
Waldock and Fish (1124).  Cain’s complaint loses relevance as developments in theory 
and ideological awareness inform later Milton criticism, while Fish’s influence continues 
to endure. 
Two years following the publication of Cain’s review, William Kerrigan 
continues to reflect the prevalence of Fish’s influence while embedding a strong critique 
of the benignity of that influence in his 1983 psychoanalytically centered study, The 
Sacred Complex.  Mainly reflecting the second category of adaptation, Kerrigan presents 
what develops into a sustained critique of Fish’s method, later cited by both Rumrich and 
Fish.  At the outset, Kerrigan acknowledges Fish’s pervasive influence.  Surprised by Sin, 
writes Kerrigan, provides a “widely accepted” solution to the dilemma of Satan’s tension 
between “mythopoeic grandeur” and the “discursive condemnation by the narrator and 
the heavenly characters” (98-99).  In an eloquent gesture of deference later cited by both 
Fish and Rumrich and worth quoting in its entirety, Kerrigan pays tribute to the influence 
of Surprised by Sin.  According to Kerrigan, Fish’s 
solution [to the Milton Controversy]…has an elegance at once 
literary and psychological.  In claiming that the tension was deliberate, 
Fish healed an old division in Milton studies.  Provided that our sense of 
his splendor be corrected repeatedly by the normative declarations of 
discursive judgment, we may permit the romantic and the theological 
Satan to evolve in us.  We are obeying intentional meaning, fulfilling the 
strategy of the poet, even when our feelings about the mythopoeic Satan 
contradict this judgment… The pious reader can entertain potentially 
rebellious attitudes knowing that, as signs of his fallenness, these attitudes 
already confirm the doctrinal content of the poem and therefore have a 
piety all their own.  (98-99) 
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In other words, Fish’s intentional version of the poem promotes doctrinal complacency.  
Here, Kerrigan both praises and illustrates the overbearing influence of Fish’s thesis, 
which subsumes other critics within its intentionalist scheme.   
However, after paying this tribute, Kerrigan launches a strong critique.  Kerrigan 
contends that the “overall effect” of Fish’s reading “is to promulgate a tyrannical notion 
of aesthetic unity at the expense of introducing, without overt recognition, a new and 
unheard-of flaw in the poem: the alarming idea that its mythopoesis is not generative but 
repetitive” (99).  Kerrigan presents the seed of later challenges to Fish’s “potentially 
reductive” thesis.  Indeed, William Kolbrener will later follow this thread, asserting that 
critics like Fish and his opponents who assume a reductive consistency fail to properly 
recognize the complexity of Milton’s thought.  The fact that Kerrigan situates his 
challenge to Surprised by Sin in the context of deferential praise reveals a certain anxiety 
about directly confronting Fish’s critical assertions.  Indeed, Kerrigan’s work does not 
represent a direct challenge to Fish’s hegemony.  Rather, like Crosman and other critics 
who follow the second pattern of response, Kerrigan issues a critique and reconsiders 
Fish in his own terms without defining his study against Fish’s. 
In a similar type of response, the same year as Kerrigan’s publication (1983), 
Herman Rapaport dedicates a section of his book-length study of Milton to contrast 
Surprised by Sin with his own postmodern method.  In Milton and the Postmodern, 
Rapaport offers an alternative theoretical framework for studying Milton, while like 
Kerrigan remaining conscious of the theoretical influence of Fish’s thesis.  While 
Rapaport provides a formidable answer to William Cain’s call for theoretical awareness 
in Milton criticism, he does not proceed without a well-considered attempt to situate 
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Fish’s reading within and in contrast to his own framework.  Fish’s work in particular 
overshadows Rapaport’s reading of Milton, the man and the author, and Rapaport is 
aware of this influence.  Like Crosman, Rapaport finds value in rewording and resituating 
the theoretical context of Fish’s observations.  Rapaport observes an undercurrent of 
deconstruction in Fish’s close readings, presenting his own translation of Fish into 
postmodern terms.  Rapaport contends that  
destructuring, or deconstruction, is most obvious in those passages 
Stanley Fish cites when he notes the reader is ‘surprised by sin,’ those 
passages in which the innocent garden and the innocent Eve are described 
in terms that for us have fallen or evil import.  Thus Eve’s ‘wanton’ 
ringlets or the garden’s ‘mazy’ contours signify what a poststructuralist 
like Derrida would call a double scene of writing, in which a bifurcated 
text is in play, in this case, a text in which the prelapsarian is described or 
perceived in terms of the postlapsarian. 
 
Here, Rapaport like Crosman accentuates the enduring relevance of Milton’s work, 
following the second pattern of response and rendering Fish’s orthodox reading in terms 
understandable to a new (here, a postmodern) set of readers.  Milton’s poem, in 
Rapaport’s view, stresses the limits of language.  Surprised by Sin acknowledges these 
tendencies, he contends, and situates them in the context of an Aristotelian metaphysical 
certainty.  
The error in Fish’s book from a Derridean point of view (and today Fish 
might agree) is the attempt to locate a source or origin in a text that is 
cloven, whose terms are, as in the metaphor of woman, in play in the 
ribbon that at once separates and confuses them. (71) 
 
Like Catherine Belsey, Rapaport stresses the indeterminacy of textual meaning, taking 
issue with Fish’s metaphysical assertion.  Thus, he implies a discontinuity between Fish’s 
later postmodern theory and the theory latent in Surprised by Sin.  However, Rapaport 
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fails to fully credit Fish’s acknowledgment of the subjectivity of textual meaning as a 
product of the reader’s subjective experience. 
Fish opens the door to Rapaport’s deconstruction, since his own description of 
God and the “fit reader” necessarily relies on a subjective critical assertion of meaning 
(or declaration of faith).  According to Rapaport, Fish demonstrates an implicit awareness 
of the deconstructive tendencies of Milton’s text.  As Rapaport writes, 
Fish shows…how Milton’s epic folds contraries over into doubles when in 
fact it should not do so, according to strict logical expectations; however, 
this doubling does not occur, as Fish believes, because the reader is simply 
ambushed, because he is tricked into making faulty assumptions about 
what words mean, but because the text itself is engaged in a 
deconstructive discourse that transgresses or trespasses from one state to 
another, that makes confusion and distinction at the same time between a 
prelapsarian tongue and a fallen one. (71)  
 
In other words, Milton’s text does not lead the reader to a predetermined conclusion of 
ethical improvement.  Rather, Rapaport contends, Fish misinterprets the self-
deconstructing text that Milton has fashioned. “What I would argue in defense of the 
guilty reader,” he continues, “is that it is this double scene of writing itself that opens up 
Paradise Lost to an economics of transgression or sin that begins with repealing the 
Aristotelian law of contradiction” (72).  The Aristotelian metaphysical certitude asserted 
by Fish represents a negative influence for Rapaport as a postmodernist.  Thus, Rapaport 
articulates the distinction between Fish’s substitution and the deconstructive approach of 
postmodern critics.  Rapaport writes that, “Unlike Fish’s static-state theory, whose 
differences are always clearly marked or decidable, the poststructuralist’s notion of a 
double scene is not an effect of a logocentric conception of thought” (72).  In response to 
the image of Milton reflected in Surprised by Sin, Rapaport likewise constructs his own 
version of Milton, the man behind the author-function, contending that Milton’s spirit is 
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divided: “a mind committed to…ideals of freedom and liberty…but a mind also 
harboring a darker fascination with dictatorial takeover, with what amounts 
to…absolutism…a sinister side to Milton’s thinking” (176).  While positing his 
postmodern interpretation, Rapaport finds it necessary to deconstruct Surprised by Sin.  
Presenting a compelling analysis of the theoretical significance of Fish’s thesis, Rapaport, 
like Kerrigan, follows the second pattern of response, both challenging and reflecting its 
overshadowing influence.   
Following the second pattern from a different methodological stance, Barbara 
Lewalski employs an intentionalist approach that recalls Fish’s pattern in her 1985 study, 
Paradise Lost and the Rhetoric of Literary Forms.  Like Rapaport and Kerrigan, 
Lewalski both challenges Fish’s reading and conveys a sense of its influence.  Following 
Fish’s post-New Critical positivism as well as his intentionalist approach to textual 
meaning, Lewalski writes that she is “concerned…with conscious artistic choices, with 
Milton’s deliberate orchestrations within the echo chamber of language” (7).  Lewalski 
posits that “Milton’s imitative and allusive strategies are essentially heuristic” and that 
there is a “rhetorical and symbolic vocabulary shared by poet and reader” (7).  Like Fish, 
she assumes the intentional view behind the poem’s pedagogy, positing with relative 
assurance her own Milton (which is taken for granted after Fish to be subjectively valid).  
Likewise, she describes the effects of the text as if it were a stable entity (again, in the 
manner of Fish).   
As Lucy Newlyn later notes in her review, Lewalski defines her methods against 
the theories of Harold Bloom as well as Fish, writing, “I do not find [Milton’s] 
engagement with literary precursors characterized by anxiety, struggle, transumption, or 
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triumph” (7).10  Resisting Fish’s view of a “rigorous and punitive teacher…causing 
[readers] to recognize and reenact their own fallenness,” she revises Fish’s corrective 
patterns like Crosman, depicting a Milton who advances “his readers’ understanding 
through a literary regimen at once intellectually demanding and delightful” (8).  
Conscious of Bloom’s theory of influence, Lewalski asserts independence of both Fish 
and Bloom.  However, Lewalski continues the methods and assumptions outlined in 
Surprised by Sin, albeit in different terms.  Thus, she reflects the influence of Fish’s work 
while like many other critics denying any such affiliation.   
In a review published the same year as Lewalski’s reading (1985), Bill Readings 
reacts strongly against the bold style of Stanley Fish, writing that 
Fish seeks to play God to the reader, saying, ‘you may not be clever 
enough to understand all my points, but you must recognize that I am 
right.’ He thus allows himself the same process of accommodation to mere 
mortals that he describes God as practicing.  None dare blow the whistle 
on Fish’s grandiose assertions.  (139) 
 
Readings thus emphasizes his concern about Fish’s practice of criticism, noting the 
frustrating “escape clause” of Fish’s theory, that “In fact, Fish cannot authorize his 
reading over anyone else’s” (140).  Indeed, as Readings stresses, critics like Lewalski 
find it more expedient to follow the first and second patterns, implicitly or explicitly 
incorporating Fish’s approach into their own. 
In light of critical response to Milton and later to Surprised by Sin, it seems 
difficult to avoid some form of intentionalist reading.  In fact, both Fish and Kolbrener 
agree that, in order to speak coherently of the author’s work, some form of intentionalist 
approach is necessary and unavoidable (Kolbrener 6).  Following the third pattern of 
                                                          
10 Bloom himself distinguishes Milton from the patterns of influence exhibited by later poets.  Here, 
Lewalski in fact seems to be in accord with Bloom, though she distinguishes her method from those of 
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direct confrontation, Lucy Newlyn warns about the dangers of Fish’s intentionalist view 
for critical consciousness in her 1986 TLS review.  At the time, writes Newlyn, Milton 
critics faced a theoretical choice between Harold Bloom on the left and Stanley Fish on 
the right.  Objecting to Fish’s centered version of Milton, Newlyn posits several 
compelling questions about the future of the critical discourse: 
Is the text controlled, as Fish would argue, by an omniscient narrator, who 
betrays the reader into fallen assumptions as part of a humiliating 
programme of education and reform?  Or alternatively (as Blake and 
Bloom would see it) are fallen implications celebrated, by narrator and 
reader alike, as the defeat of Our Great Forbidder Reason (the ego) by 
Desire (the id)?  (871) 
 
Newlyn decries the “baleful effect” on criticism of the prevalent “extreme intentionalist 
view” directly or indirectly linked to Fish (871).  Fish, for Newlyn, has become in 
Bloom’s terms, a covering cherub barring critical innovation and the embracing of 
multiple meanings.   
Further, Newlyn laments that the “moral scheme” Fish articulates consistently 
informs critical assumptions.  For instance, Newlyn finds Barbara Lewalski’s suggestive 
treatment of Milton’s allusion stifled by moralistic reduction, in which evil’s “disturbing 
likeness [to heroic figures] is seen as the ironic confirmation of reassuring difference, by 
which it is finally subdued” (871).  Other studies relating to Milton’s poetic influences 
consistently subordinate “the ambiguous workings of allusion” to an essentially Christian 
“higher truth” (871).  While “Homeric and Virgilian allusions…are a vital source of 
tension,” critics ultimately tend to dissect Satan’s “version of events” in favor of a 
Christian reading (871).  In the end, Newlyn writes, “the reader can either become 
ensnared in the subtext or choose to subjugate words to the Word” (871).   
                                                                                                                                                                             
Bloom’s followers (who might consider Milton in light of his literary forbearer, Edmund Spencer). 
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Continuing her attack, Newlyn contends that a paralyzing intentionalist approach 
prevents critics from viewing Paradise Lost in light of post-Derridean theory.  To 
demonstrate, Newlyn cites R.A. Shoaf’s contention that, “More than any other text I 
know…Paradise Lost is intended.  To deconstruct…would necessarily be to transgress.”  
As Newlyn later contends, however, “allusion is transgression,” and the ironic “‘subtext’ 
of Paradise Lost offers a valuation of the fallen world which is integral to its meaning” 
(“Paradise Lost” and the Romantic Reader 66).  As Newlyn is doubtless aware, Fish 
himself would agree with this assessment, yet in addition to this valuation he would 
reassert his view that Milton allows this “subtext” as part of his strategy in illustrating the 
reader’s perception of fallen consciousness.  It is human desires and emphases that need 
to be refocused, Fish implies; the poem does not need to be adjusted to modern demands.  
Reacting to this contextualization, Newlyn expresses her concern that the influence of 
Surprised by Sin has reached the point of influenza. 
 
(iii) CRYSTALLIZATION (1987-1997) 
 
More than any effusive praise, sustained challenges to Fish’s hegemony denote 
the enduring influence and critical recognition of his work during this span.  Two book-
length studies, both published in time for the thirty-year anniversary of Surprised by Sin’s 
initial publication, follow the third pattern and focus primarily on unseating Fish’s 
version of Milton.  As is true for Milton’s God, his influence is best measured in the 
exertions of his challengers, among whom Joseph Wittreich asserts himself in 1987.  
Though in his earlier work, Wittreich finds Fish’s thesis useful, his critical consideration 
of feminism alters this view and ignites his anxiety.  This year, Joseph Wittreich 
publishes The Feminist Milton, both a call for altering the direction of “new feminist” 
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Milton criticism and an insightful examination of overlooked historical responses of 
women.  Wittreich’s feminist approach to critical history resembles Kolbrener’s later 
historiographical contribution; both present sustained critiques of critical trends through a 
careful consideration of old and new criticism, and both follow the third pattern of 
directly confronting Fish’s influence.   
Wittreich calls for a reconciliation in the “bifurcated” feminist criticism, a 
division, he writes, between those who focus on “how to read Milton” and those who 
emphasize “how Milton came to be read” (7).  Wittreich aligns himself with the 
“revisionary view of literary history, which sees Milton’s early female readership rising 
up against the patriarchal tradition of Scripture and sees Milton himself as an ally in, not 
antagonist to, such an enterprise” (7).  Wittreich continues that, “Those…engaging 
feminist issues often align themselves with the tired clichés of Christian humanism, while 
those…venturing supposedly new readings of Milton’s poetry mount their antipatriarchal 
interpretations upon the patriarchal criticism (theoretical, literary…) of Harold Bloom 
[and] Stanley Fish” (8).  Indeed, Fish’s reader fits the “self-idealized academic male 
reader” which Wittreich contrasts with his “historical female readership” (8).  Following 
the critiques of Cain and Newlyn, Wittreich claims that, though Fish’s method may  
foster critical independence…it simultaneously forfeits a critical 
consciousness.  When criticism is depoliticized, so are the texts it 
addresses.  When its texts are depoliticized, they become, along with the 
criticism they sponsor, compliant to the institutions of civilization and 
transmitters of its ideologies.  By resisting social and political 
impingements on criticism, such neutrality also disallows political 
sophistication and historical engagement in the texts…it ensures the 
separation of art and society.  A carryover from the New Critics, this 
neutrality is no proper servant for a feminist criticism.  (151) 
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The “feminist criticism” Wittreich posits would offer a subjective substitution similar to 
Fish’s own.  Wittreich’s suggested approach “would bring the stammerings of a text to 
full utterance…would construct positive, not negative, models of exchange between art 
and society” (151).  Fish’s “model of exchange” in Surprised by Sin would certainly be 
unpalatable to the ideology of feminism, particularly as it is expressed by Wittreich.  The 
full articulation of the “stammerings” Wittreich suggests would likely represent contrast 
with Fish’s own asserted meanings.  Thus, writing in the context of feminist criticism and 
following the third pattern of response, Wittreich finds Fish a source of anxiety, 
highlighting one aspect of the ideological function of Fish’s influential thesis. 
In contrast to Wittreich’s response, Marshall Grossman follows the first pattern, 
incorporating Fish’s thesis into his individual critical practice.  In his 1987 work, 
“Authors to Themselves”: Milton and the Revelation of History, Grossman indicates a 
general harmony between Fish’s approach to the “fallen” reader and his own method.  
For example, in considering the problem of Milton’s God, Grossman writes that “The 
difficulty of accepting the Father is, as Stanley Fish points out, a measure of our 
‘crookedness’ or, in the terms of the present argument, the exorbitance of our desires” 
(50).  Like many critics before and after his own, Grossman translates Fish’s language 
into his own formula, appropriating or “transuming” the method of Surprised by Sin into 
his own framework. 
While critics like Grossman adopt and work within Fish’s terms, John Peter 
Rumrich follows the third pattern and takes his place as one of the strongest challengers 
to the influence of Surprised by Sin.  One of the most vocal advocates of the heretical 
Milton during this decade, Rumrich co-edits a collection dedicated to Milton and Heresy, 
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challenging the more-than-residual influence of Fish’s work from the late 1980s through 
the late 1990s.  In 1987, the same year as Grossman writes, Rumrich publishes Matter of 
Glory: A New Preface to “Paradise Lost,” in which surfaces the seed of his later 
criticism of Fish’s harsh pedagogy.  Rumrich writes that “the catechismal version of 
Paradise Lost proposed by Fish resembles more the work of a Presbyterian didact such as 
the self-righteous Richard Baxter (seven citations in Surprised by Sin) than the work of a 
politico-religious Independent like Milton” (Matter of Glory 9-10).  Rumrich again 
remarks ruefully in 1990 (and reformulates in his 1996 book-length expansion) that “the 
contemporary generation of Milton scholars seems to agree that Paradise Lost instructs 
readers by convicting them of sin” (“Uninventing Milton” 250).   
Sustaining his critique for roughly a decade, Rumrich targets Fish’s emphasis on 
punitive reader-education, referring to Fish’s reading as “pedagogically disastrous” (252).  
He strongly critiques Fish’s emphasis on “reconstructing the historically appropriate 
reader” while falling to the “historicist” temptation of “reducing the subject to his 
background” (252).  In Milton Unbound, his 1996 expansion of his thesis challenging 
Fish’s “hegemony,” Rumrich attempts the daunting task of dismantling Surprised by Sin 
“on its own terms” (3).  Rumrich takes issue with the post-Fish “invented Milton, a 
rhetorical artifact or paradigm foundational to contemporary Milton scholarship,”11 and 
                                                          
11 For one example, Rumrich cites a “recent, award-winning book,” Georgia B. Christopher, Milton and the 
Science of the Saints (Princeton, 1982), 144.  Christopher writes that “Stanley Fish has shown how 
Paradise Lost is constructed for evangelical purposes so as to elicit a pattern of alternating identification 
with and rejection of the characters, in order to convict the reader of sin” (144, italics mine).  Interestingly, 
the award Rumrich notes here is the Milton Society’s annual James Holly Hanford Award for the 
outstanding contribution to Milton studies.  Fish’s republication of the second edition of Surprised by Sin 
with a new preface also won the Hanford Award—for “Best Book of 1997.”  Rumrich cites this award as a 
useful indicator of a work’s acceptance within Milton’s “interpretive community” (“Uninventing Milton” 
250, n.6).  If Surprised by Sin needed any reaffirmation, reception of the Hanford Award would indicate a 
positive response. 
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he attempts to supplant Fish’s orthodoxy with “Milton’s heretical materialism” (xii).  
Fish’s work, he contends, “inaugurated a period in Milton criticism analogous to what 
Kuhn describes as ‘normal science,’ a condition in which practitioners expend their 
labors to extend and deepen a working paradigm rather than rehash fundamental issues 
that it resolved” (2).   
Though this situation might seem to be a positive development, Rumrich like 
Newlyn finds the post-Fish stasis in Milton studies woefully unenergetic.  Rumrich 
emphasizes the strong cultural and ideological significance of Fish’s work for subsequent 
critics, noting that, “for some, disputes over critical methodology do not signify in 
comparison with what might be regarded as the cultural stakes—Milton’s allegiance to an 
unproblematic, centrist orthodoxy” (3).  “In the case of Milton scholarship,” Rumrich 
writes,  
the internal logic of what I call the paradigmatic Milton may be 
described as a closed dialectical circuit.  The dialectical structure has 
helped a very misleading vision of the poet to prosper—the representation 
of Milton as a carping didact, aggressive misogynist, and poet of the 
emerging bourgeoisie. (xii)  
 
In part using Marxist critical terms, Rumrich attempts to redeem Milton from such 
charges by disestablishing Fish’s generally accepted “invention” of Milton.  Like 
Newlyn, Rumrich is comfortable with uncertainty and “multiplicity,” stating that “the 
victory of Paradise Lost, to the extent Milton manages it, lies in helping us to accept the 
ambiguity, doubt, and indeterminacy constitutional of our lives, without succumbing to 
the fear that our existence is meaningless, or worse, malignant” (xii).   
Contrary to Fish’s Milton, Rumrich holds that “material indeterminacy and 
inconclusiveness, in the formlessness of chaos, are for Milton constitutional of the 
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cosmos, of morality, and indeed are essential to the deity himself” (xii).  Stanley Fish 
responds to Rumrich in his 1997 preface, however, emphasizing that his “assertion of a 
God who is really God is not at odds with human choice and its incredibly rich history in 
‘the Race of time’ (Paradise Lost 12.554); rather, it is his absolute power that at once 
makes available the space of human choice and renders it meaningful by providing it with 
a centre” (lxiv).  Fish finalizes his refutation of Rumrich by asserting the futility of 
Rumrich’s declared intention to attack Fish’s “structure of thought” on its own terms.  
Rumrich would do better, Fish implies, to assert his own independent structure as a viable 
alternative.  Though Rumrich attempts to construct an alternative in the manner of 
Christopher Hill and others, his study falls primarily in the third category, exerting its 
energy chiefly toward decentering Fish’s own construction. 
In 1988, Richard Corum follows the second pattern of response, addressing the 
influence of Fish’s thesis by situating it in his own critical terms.  Preceding Rumrich’s 
later book-length attack on Fish’s thesis, Richard Corum provides an interesting 
psychologically based critique of Fish, summarizing Surprised by Sin in psychoanalytic 
terms.  In his article published in Milton and the Idea of Woman, Corum restates Fish’s 
thesis, writing that “Milton puts all the rich and beautiful adolescent trinkets about the 
door of the cave where the invisible icon stands.”  The purpose of this array of verbal 
glitter, according to Corum, is entrapment, “so that those of us who are like Stephano and 
Trinculo can mistake this inherently imaginary, material ‘trash’—Eve’s watery image, for 
example, or Satan’s massive weapons—if we will, for what is truly real, namely, the 
symbolic structure of the adult Father’s law” (Milton and the Idea of Woman 147).  
Corum’s image-laden summary describes Fish’s work in part through language of New 
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Criticism, in particular recalling the title of William K. Wimsatt’s landmark 1954 New 
Critical study, The Verbal Icon.   
While Corum engages and appropriates Fish in his own critical terms, many other 
critics during this time follow the fourth pattern and work without any stated or apparent 
reference to Fish’s approach.  In 1988, Re-Membering Milton is published, a volume of 
criticism featuring a diversity of method and theoretical representation, from Mary 
Nyquist’s essay, “The Genesis of Gendered Subjectivity in the Divorce Tracts and in 
Paradise Lost,” to Corlivia Herron’s “Milton and Afro-American Literature.”  In 1994, 
Gale Carrithers and James Hardy consider Milton and the Hermeneutic Journey without 
deference or explicit reference to the revolutionary critical hermeneutics of Surprised by 
Sin.  In short, while many critics affirm Fish’s influence during the span from 1987 
through 1997, that influence is also challenged directly and even more through 
conspicuous lack of acknowledgment among a representation of criticism. 
As I have stressed, an awareness of critical anxiety often characterizes the 
language of critical studies of Milton criticism.  It is virtually a commonplace that Milton 
critics, at least since Bentley, have often tended to identify with their subject to the point 
of asserting meaning in the name of the author.  One aspect of author-based criticism, 
after all, is an affinity for the function—John Milton, for instance—which unifies the 
body of work.  Not all authors inspire the response that Milton elicits, however, as 
William Kolbrener observes in his 1996 study of Milton criticism under what he 
considers the unproductive historiographical “governing trope” of the war in heaven.  
Among “meta-criticism,” Kolbrener’s Milton’s Warring Angels: A Study of Critical 
Engagements represents a formidable alternative to the view of good versus evil, angels 
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versus demons.  Following the third pattern of response, Kolbrener both challenges the 
terms of Fish’s hegemony and presents a historically conscious alternative. 
Kolbrener views Fish’s influence in a different context than that of Rumrich, 
setting Fish’s reading among a tradition of Whig interpretations that essentially begins 
with Bentley’s 1732 edition of Paradise Lost.  Though Kolbrener, in contrast with 
Rumrich, does not see Fish’s reading as overtly “dominant,” he contends that the modern 
“satanic” readings of a heretical, revolutionary Milton define themselves against Fish’s 
work, using Fish’s terms.  Kolbrener writes that 
an implicit argument of this study is that Fish’s angelic reading of 
Milton—once dominant in the field—sets the terms for a variety of 
contemporary satanic readings of Milton.  This latest set of tensions 
between Fish and a new generation of neo-Marxist critics realizes a 
paradigm initiated in the late seventeenth century. (4)  
 
Recalling earlier evaluations such as Belsey’s, Kolbrener asserts that “Stanley 
Fish…constructs an ‘absolutist’ Milton in direct competition with the ‘liberal’ Milton of a 
previous generation” (3).  According to Kolbrener, an unproductive opposition 
monopolizes the terms of critical discourse on Milton.  Considering Milton as either 
orthodox or heretic, reactionary or revolutionary, modern critics follow a lexicon which 
fails to allow for any “polyvalence” in the author’s text.  Kolbrener sees Fish as 
perpetuating the same false either-or dichotomy.  Instead of allowing for variation, 
Kolbrener implies, critics like Fish transmute the author’s ideas through their own 
confining ideological terms.   
According to Kolbrener, the arguments of Christopher Kendrick, “the most 
powerful contemporary variation of the satanic argument” (3), and others within the 
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“satanic” camp define themselves against Fish’s terms.  Kolbrener himself adopts a 
historically conscious intentionalist thesis, asserting,  
Though I will not go so far as to agree with Stanley Fish that ‘there is only 
one true interpretation of Paradise Lost,’ the current sets of readings, 
ultimately intentionalist (and thus more like Fish’s than either Corns’s or 
Jameson’s), argues for a Milton who produced texts, not ‘internally 
contradictory’ as in Corns’s reading, but polyvalent. (6) 
 
Kolbrener notes that his own methodology is in some ways consistent with that of 
Thomas N. Corns, “whose investigation into ‘the plurality of Miltonic ideology’ has led 
him (following the historiographical impulse) to affirm that the ‘multiplicity of Miltons’ 
is ‘reflective’ of ‘the cultural and political assumptions’ of its various interpreters” (6).  
In contrast, Kolbrener writes, “Where Corns argues for various distinct versions of 
Milton, each bearing its own aspect of ‘unity,’ I am arguing for a unified reading of 
Milton which—to echo the primary metaphor of mediation in the seventeenth century, 
discordia concors—has multiple aspects” (6).  Indeed, Kolbrener’s approach does follow 
the second pattern of response in adopting the intentional approach, though one of his 
main objects is the disestablishment of Fish’s hegemony. 
In part by reconsidering the problems that Surprised by Sin assuaged, Kolbrener 
arrives at his own alternate reading of Milton and Milton’s critics.  He states that, “In 
Corns’s reading, Milton’s critics have extrapolated unified readings from Milton’s 
‘convoluted’ text; in my reading, it is the critics who have made Milton ‘convoluted’ by 
insisting upon monolithic reading of his works” (6).  Here surfaces Kobrener’s critique of 
the meta-critical trope of the war in heaven.  Ultimately, Kolbrener argues, Milton in part 
employed a lexicon resistant to interpretation by post-Enlightenment readers who sought 
to appropriate his poetry for their own.  Milton’s complex lexicon, he contends, is at least 
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partially responsible for ongoing (and ultimately unresolvable) disputes over Milton as a 
unified religious or political—ideological—mouthpiece.  In view of Milton’s resistance 
to the lexicon of post-Enlightenment criticism, Kolbrener holds that the war in heaven is 
“not the most appropriate paradigm for interpreters of Milton’s works” (7).   
To a certain extent, the success of Kolbrener’s work like Fish’s stands on its own 
critical reception.  He notes his own susceptibility to his method, writing that “There may 
be many ways of historicizing this study” (7).  Indeed, criticism could conceivably 
degenerate into infinite self-scrutiny, as Christopher Hill warns, but Kolbrener attempts 
to derail what he sees as the blind trends that govern critical views.  Kolbrener does not 
claim to transcend the intentionalist identification with his author-subject; rather, in the 
manner of Fish, he self-consciously asserts the subjectivity of his participation in the 
interpretive community.  In the process of critiquing Fish’s complicity in the false 
argument of “Whig history,” Kolbrener follows the logical consequences of Fish’s 
method in his own approach.  As Bloom theorizes, critics suffer anxieties similar to those 
of poets.  Kolbrener demonstrates the pertinence of this theory, adapting Fish’s 
contextualization of critics to include Fish himself.  Where Fish places critics in two 
camps, each with a “valid response” to his Milton, Kolbrener presents a brilliant 
transumption of Fish’s thesis, situating Fish as the leading expositor of an ideological 
lexicon that is in large part foreign to (Kolbrener’s) Milton.  Beside Rumrich, Kolbrener 
represents Fish’s strongest challenger.  Like Crosman and other critics in the second 
category, Kolbrener evinces a thorough, sustained engagement with Fish’s work, 
adopting and adapting his methods to a new purpose.  However, more than Crosman or 
even Kerrigan, Kolbrener directs his study to countering the influence of Fish’s work.  
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Again, as Kolbrener has noted, the success of his work depends like Fish’s on practical 
usefulness and positive reception. 
 As if Kolbrener and Rumrich had hailed the second coming of their critical 
subject, Stanley Fish republished Surprised by Sin a year later, in 1997, with an extensive 
preface that addresses significant challenges to his thesis over the course of several 
decades.  Like Milton’s good Christian who embraces challenges to strengthen virtue, 
Fish the Miltonist answers the criticism of the past decades and strengthens the faith he 
declares in his Milton and his poem.  The conclusion of this span is heralded by the 
republication of Surprised by Sin with a new preface signifying the author’s continued 
engagement in sustaining its influence. 
(iv) SLIGHT VARIATIONS (1997-PRESENT) 
 
During this most recent span, in 2001, Fish publishes his expansive and insightful 
follow-up to Surprised by Sin, How Milton Works, in which he notes that his thoughts on 
Milton have varied only slightly since his first consideration (i).  Critical responses to and 
variations upon Surprised by Sin continue to proliferate.  Likewise, an increasing volume 
of criticism is published in the third pattern of response, from alternative theoretical and 
critical standpoints.  Milton and the Grounds of Contention, published in 2003, features 
psychoanalytic, historicist, and other methods from which direct reference to Fish’s 
theory is conspicuously absent.   
In her 1998 work, The Ruins of Allegory, Catherine Gimelli Martin echoes the 
anxiety of Rumrich that “most critics still adhere to the influential model outlined by Fish 
[in Surprised by Sin]” (133).  Following the third pattern of response, Martin finds Fish’s 
method detrimental to her critical practice.  In particular, she critiques Fish’s underlying 
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metaphysical assumptions.  Martin laments the “suspicion of metaphor” that results from 
Fish’s influence, lamenting that “the Miltonic image continues to conform to the standard 
laws of Christianity and Neoplatonism” (133).  Martin writes that under Fish’s method, 
the  
presumed vitalism of Milton’s “symbolic” poetics is thus falsely 
identified with Christianity’s characteristic attempt to transcend the literal 
in the metaphysical Word; and so, in place of the kinesthetic dynamism of 
the baroque image, the reader of Paradise Lost supposedly discovers an 
archetypal world of mystified metaphors that doubly bond abstract with 
concrete qualities. (134) 
 
Where Martin reads a “kinesthetic dynamism” in Milton’s use of image, she finds Fish’s 
Christian metaphysics hermeneutically limiting.  Following the third pattern of response, 
Martin confronts Fish’s method as an obstacle to her own critical productivity. 
In contrast to Martin, without expression of anxiety or attack on Fish’s hegemony, 
Robert McMahon provides a compelling revision of Fish’s thesis in 1998 with The Two 
Poets of “Paradise Lost.”  Following the second pattern of adapting and revising Fish’s 
thesis, McMahon situates Milton’s narrative voice in the epic tradition, presenting a 
solution to the standing critique of the harshness of Fish’s pedagogical narrative.  Instead 
of the “chastening” narrative voice of Fish, who ignores the figure of the narrator and 
identifies Milton “solely with the author of the poem,” McMahon posits that “Milton 
created a narrator who is imagining his poem in an ongoing present” (11).  This narrator 
(a Bard in the oral tradition) experiences the poem’s temptations temporally, with the 
reader; here, “the reader is chastened because the Bard chastens himself” (11).  Here, 
while allowing for the preservation of Fish’s thesis, McMahon employs a distinction Fish 
fails to make between Milton and his narrator, disarming critiques of Fish’s pedagogy by 
rendering the narrator a sympathetic sharer in the reader’s experience. 
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Where McMahon revises Fish’s thesis to render Milton’s narrator more 
sympathetic, Neil Forsyth does the same for Satan.  If any work after Fish effectively 
renders a cohesive vision of Satan’s incumbency in Paradise Lost, that work is Neil 
Forsyth’s 2001 study, The Satanic Epic.  Forsyth alleges “a conscious attempt by 
orthodox, pro-God critics (whether actively Christian or not) to deflate Satan’s 
wonderfully persuasive rhetoric and show forth his moral flaws” (4).  Yet, rather than 
challenging Surprised by Sin as a work of “pro-God” criticism, Forsyth primarily follows 
the first and second patterns of response, drawing on Fish’s method in harmony with his 
own.  Assuming, like Fish, a view of the text as an agent interacting with the reader, 
Forsyth presents a reading in line with Fish’s but in sentiment affiliated with Romantic 
readings.  According to Forsyth “The poem…invites us, during its concluding dialogue 
with the angel, to take seriously the possibility that Adam might rejoice at his own sin.  If 
that is the Satanic choice, so be it.  The poem frequently invites similar choices from its 
readers, and makes the choices hard” (73).  Forsyth shares with Lucy Newlyn an affinity 
for indeterminacy, a belief in Milton’s own uncertainty about Satan, though he does not 
reject Fish’s central pedagogical emphasis.  Milton, living in an “age of controversy,” 
realized that “Satan was the vehicle for the articulation of such controversies” (73).  
According to Forsyth, “some of the fascination of his poetry lies in…how close he makes 
one side feel to the other” (73).  The reader here still learns his own weakness; what 
Forsyth stresses is the over-rationalized impact Satan actually has on the unsuspecting 
reader.  Forsyth’s reading reflects a sustained engagement with Surprised by Sin; as he 
acknowledges, his reading is not in direct argument with Fish.  Rather, Forsyth 
demonstrates that the appeal of Satan and his revolutionary associations is not lessened 
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by reading Paradise Lost through Fish’s method.  In adapting and enhancing Fish’s 
thesis, Forsyth follows the second pattern in acknowledging Fish’s work as a functional 
and essential part of his Miltonic critical heritage. 
Joanna Picciotto presents another compelling and perhaps more straightforward 
variation on Fish’s thesis, while incorporating elements of Newlyn’s critique12.  Picciotto 
embraces the potentially destabilizing similarities between fallen and unfallen language, 
while situating them again in the reader’s experience of edification.  Adhering to Fish’s 
premise that Paradise Lost aims to experientially correct the reader’s fallen perception, 
Picciotto argues that Milton’s language emphasizes a disturbing continuity between fallen 
and unfallen states, rather than the “rigid boundary” that Fish renders between the two 
realms of experience (40).  Instead of sharp lapsarian distinctions surprising the reader, it 
is disturbing continuity that challenges the reader’s complacent perception of a distant, 
incommensurable Eden.  Picciotto argues that “Milton’s famous dips into apparently 
fallen syntax when describing life in paradise are just what they seem to be: attempts to 
unsettle an at once naive and corrupt understanding of innocence as a reassuringly alien 
and irrecoverable condition to which no ‘fallen’ modifier could ever be usefully applied” 
(40).  The challenge for Picciotto’s reader, then, is that the original state is recoverable, 
but only through constant work.  Picciotto essentially reformulates Fish’s emphasis on 
Christian edification, rather than asserting a wholly independent structure of 
interpretation.  Indeed, the innovative readings of Picciotto, Forsyth and McMahon 
represent only a few noteworthy contributions within the grand sweep of critical work on 
Milton during this time frame.   
                                                          
12 For Newlyn’s argument, see above, p.32. 
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The responses I have analyzed over the course of this chapter follow four basic 
patterns in addressing Fish’s view of Milton: acceptance, revision, challenge, and 
refocusing.  As I have stressed, each pattern reveals a continued critical acknowledgment 
of the significance of Fish’s work for Milton scholarship.  Criticism is an ongoing 
dialogue, and Surprised by Sin itself has become the object of such a sustained exchange.  
This dialogue has helped to clarify the enduring value of Fish’s work.  As angels and 
demons acclaim and accuse, what emerges is a continually dynamic artefact of Milton 
criticism.  However, the method articulated by Fish is obviously not the only major 
discourse among Miltonists.  Other critics continue to follow the fourth pattern and 
refocus their debates within the terms of feminist, Marxist, psychoanalytic, or 
poststructuralist theories.  All theory sets the dimensions for critical allegory (a Marxist, 
for instance, might construct a complex economic allegory), and Fish posits a plausible 
set of terms for Paradise Lost: the Christian allegory.  Where postmodern critics interpret 
Milton’s poem according to their own dimensions, Fish operates on the assumption that 
Milton’s affirmation of faith is fundamentally distinct from those of postmodern theorists.  
Thus, critics attempting to refocus critical allegory away from Christian terms find the 
emphasis of Fish’s practice unhelpful (if historically plausible).  In the following chapter, 
then, I will discuss the relation of Fish’s Christian metaphysical assumptions to his 
continued critical influence.  
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CHAPTER 3 
SURPRISED BY THEORY: THE CRITIC 
An influential work of criticism can reconfigure the terms of its own discussion, 
and, as the critics surveyed have implicitly and explicitly attested, Surprised by Sin 
achieves this effect.  Though Fish’s text represents one critical voice among many, its 
combined stance in theory and practice fortify it from straight empirical disproval.  
Realizing the limits of the “objectivity” reflected in earlier critical writing and refined in 
the methods of the New Critics, Fish boldly forays into uncharted critical terrain.  Where 
critics like Brooks and Wimsatt religiously dodge subjectivist pitfalls (the “intentional” 
and “affective” fallacies), Fish jumps directly into the fray, defining the author’s intention 
as the creation of an affective experience.  Assuming the mantle of subjectivity, Fish 
fuses New Critical assertive confidence with theory, describing Milton’s text as an 
objective entity in the context of his subjective experience as reader.  Fish surprises the 
critical establishment by reformulating the “traditional” Milton, using theory to solve a 
controversy ultimately rooted in theory.   
As Patrick Murray observes in his critical survey published the same year as 
Surprised by Sin, “The Milton Controversy has often been less concerned with the merits 
and defects of Paradise Lost than with the claims of rival critical theories” (10).  Where, 
during this controversy, “Milton and his work have been drawn into literary politics, into 
arguments about the merits of Christianity” (Murray 10), Fish offers an escape from such 
thinly veiled theological and metaphysical disputes.  Both ideological camps hold valid 
positions, in Fish’s schema, and Milton intends their reactions to his text.  However, 
rather than deconstructing Milton’s text from a postmodern view, Fish centers his version 
of Paradise Lost in Lewis’s orthodox Christianity. 
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In reconstructing a literary-theoretical version of the orthodox Milton and 
Paradise Lost, Fish posits his own versions of both author and text.  Where critics as 
early as Blake questioned Milton’s affinity for his God, Fish posits that Milton’s God 
truly exists for Milton as the generative, metaphysically real, perfect being.  Fish’s Milton 
places the onus of interpretation on fallen humanity rather than blaming God for failing to 
reach those who chose to disregard him.  Thus, critics who expect Milton to conform to 
modern standards of poetry and ideology end up like Eliot condemning the poet and his 
poem.  Surprised by Sin challenges the expectations of modern critics, constantly 
stressing Milton’s emphasis on Christian virtue in contrast to the view of Milton as a 
prototypical liberal humanist.  Thus, Fish asserts a Milton who acknowledges and rejects 
the modern metaphysical perspective that linguistic meaning has no transcendent origin.   
In elaborating his method, Fish describes his critical strategy as a metaphysical 
“politics of being,” acknowledging in his 1997 preface that his defense of Surprised by 
Sin seemingly “turned objectors into devils and replied to their points by hitting them 
over the head with mine” (lxv).  Fish further articulates the critical significance of his 
method, proclaiming from his subjective pulpit that 
a criticism that puts its faith in empirical research is condemned 
because it flies in the face of the politics of being (as if the politics of 
being were an established fact and not a disputable thesis), which is also to 
condemn it for reversing the priority of first conceptions over the realm of 
experience…which is also to condemn it for being idolatrous in that it 
looks for meaning and value in all the wrong places. (lxv)  
 
In parentheses, Fish circumscribes and highlights the contingency, the internal “structure 
of thought” of his theoretical stance.  He can assert this self-referential circularity without 
apology because it is consistent with his Milton; thus, he maintains that “circularity, of a 
deep not meretricious kind, is what I attribute to Milton’s universe where…all virtues are 
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one virtue” (lxv).  Elaborating on his original argument in a 1996 article, “Why We Can’t 
All Just Get Along,” Fish stresses the perceptual limitations of the “modern liberal-
enlightenment picture of cognitive activity in which the mind is conceived of as a 
calculating and assessing machine that is open to all thoughts and closed to none” (26).   
In Surprised by Sin, Fish not only illustrates the challenges of Milton’s fit reader; 
he asserts the inadequacies of the modern critic in interpreting Milton’s work.  Thus, 
critics who would define Milton in terms of modern ideology react strongly against the 
influence of Fish’s thesis.  The following two sections further explore the theoretical 
underpinnings of Fish’s work and influence, both in the assertion of a consistent, 
orthodox substitution of Milton’s author-function and in the metaphysical assertion of the 
centrality of Milton’s God.  A consideration of Surprised by Sin in the context of the 
poststructuralist theory of Derrida and Foucault, in particular, I believe, will further 
illuminate the nature of Fish’s “hegemony.”  As I will emphasize, the critical anxiety 
reflected above in part stems from the theoretical posturing discussed below.   
(i) MILTON: THE AUTHOR-FUNCTION 
The visceral responses of critics since Milton’s own time indicate that the name 
“John Milton” represents a formidable author-function among English literary figures, 
challenging the central beliefs of his readers   As Kolbrener contends, Milton’s readers 
often attempt to appropriate the author for their own ideological ends.  Thus, critics like 
Rumrich object to methods that “imply that Milton is a trophy in an intellectual war, an 
object secured only by removal to the camp of the victors” (“Uninventing Milton” 251).  
Though Milton as an author rarely seems to evade controversy, particularly in his prose 
writing, the reception of his poem Paradise Lost has never unambiguously affirmed 
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either its heterodoxy or its orthodoxy.  As the work of Joseph Wittreich evinces, a 
historically diverse readership found significance through the culturally revolutionary 
elements latent in the poem’s subtext.  In contrast, Fish criticizes what he calls the 
“liberal-humanist” version of Milton, in his 1997 preface, decrying the liberal synthesis 
of the author which maintains that, “despite aspects of his theology and ethics that seem 
unyielding and ungenerous, Milton is really a good hearted celebrator of difference, and a 
proto-postmodernist to boot” (xli).  More recent controversies over authorial intention 
have focused on the relation between Milton’s prose, particularly De doctrina Christiana, 
and his poetry.13  As W.H. Auden wrote that Freud became a “climate of opinion” more 
than a name, so the author-function Milton has come to represent a wide range of 
opposing opinion.14  The name Milton when used in critical discourse hardly calls to 
mind a cohesive point of reference; rather, it performs what Foucault might describe as a 
“classificatory function” (147).  Conscious or unconscious exploitation of this function, 
for instance, would allow critics who seek to appropriate Milton for the “satanic” camp to 
read Milton’s prose writing as a more-or-less direct gloss upon his poetry.   
Earlier and more recent controversies over the attribution and significance of De 
doctrina Christiana attest to the significance of the questions of authorship and the actual 
coherence and interrelation of Milton’s vast array of writings.  These questions touch the 
core of literary criticism and theory:  Do we read Paradise Lost (or any other poetic work 
                                                          
13 A good summary of this controversy can be found in John P. Rumrich, “The Provenance of De doctrina 
Christiana: A View of the Present State of the Controversy,” Milton and Heresy.  For original essays on 
this controversy, see William B. Hunter, “The Provenance of the Christian Doctrine,” Studies in English 
Literature 32 (1992): 129-42.  Responses by Barbara K. Lewalski and John T. Shawcross, as well as 
rebuttal by Hunter, follow Hunter’s essay under the title “Forum: Milton’s Christian Doctrine,” 143-66. 
14 Auden writes upon Freud’s death, "to us he is no more a person / Now but a whole climate of opinion / 
Under whom we conduct our different lives" ("In Memory of Sigmund Freud [d. Sept. 1939]," Collected 
Poems, ed. Edward Mendelson, 1976, 217). 
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ascribed to Milton) as an independent entity, distinct in purpose, time, and context, even 
from other works of the same author?  In discussing conceptions of the “heretical 
Milton,” Stephen Dobranski poignantly observes that “Modern criticism’s strategy for 
defining the author requires the resolution of inconsistencies” (Milton and Heresy 146). 
Dobranski thus finds a valuable comment on the various controversies involving Milton 
in Foucault’s “What Is an Author?”  The notion of author, as Dobranski cites Foucault,15 
“constitutes a principle of unity in writing,” and “serves to neutralize the contradictions 
that are found in a series of texts” (146).   
Kolbrener’s “angelic” and “satanic” camps both deploy this strategy, with the 
angelic side either struggling to downplay the governing unity of the author-function in 
this case, or attempting to remove De doctrina Christiana as a subheading of John Milton 
altogether.  Satanic critics in response employ similar tactics in reverse, enacting a 
critical debate for which Kolbrener’s trope of the war in heaven becomes an apt 
metaphor.  It is, of course, possible to read Milton’s heterodox prose writing, as Fish has, 
in terms of a public challenge put forth to evoke an equally strong response from his 
audience, thereby invigorating the faith of his hearers.  Thus, for example, Milton 
challenges the “fugitive and cloister’d virtue” of his countrymen in Areopagitica 
(Selected Prose 213).  As such, the author, who emphatically denies the possibility of 
achieving absolute truth through fallen human eyes (Selected Prose 234-35), formulates 
his heresies as contentious assertions, arriving at what some critics see as heretical 
conclusions.  Yet these critics make the same mistake ascribed to “orthodox” critics, 
                                                          
15 Dobranski cites Michel Foucault, “What Is an Author?” Language, Counter-Memory, Practice, trans. 
Donald F. Bouchard and Sherry Simon (Ithaca, 1977), 113-38.  The translation I use can be found in 
Textual Strategies: Perspectives in Post-Structuralist Criticism, ed. and trans. Josué Harari (1979), 141-60. 
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subscribing to a counter-orthodoxy in the closed binary opposition to which Kolbrener 
alludes.  What these critics miss, Fish might argue, is the inconclusiveness of Milton’s 
theological search.  The further error, then, is that heretical critics affirm a critical stasis 
in denying the function of “ethical self-interpretation” to Milton’s works (Rumrich, 
“Uninventing” 251).  Milton alludes to this function in Areopagitica when he states that 
“Bad books” (by implication heretical, revolutionary, countercultural books) “to a 
discreet and judicious Reader serve…to discover, to confute, to forewarn, and to 
illustrate” the reader’s preexistent faith (Selected Prose 211).  When critics assume De 
doctrina Christiana or any other prose work as a doctrinal gloss on Paradise Lost or any 
other poem, such critics construct an alternate version of a complacent, doctrinal Milton.   
“There is, of course, no patented way to read Milton,” New Critic Cleanth Brooks 
humbly acknowledges, thirteen years before Fish copyrights his own compelling reading 
(173).  In 1954, Brooks takes issue with “misapplied biographical interest [in Milton] and 
misapplied interest in his ideas.”  Commenting on the Milton Controversy, Brooks 
continues that “a great deal of the distaste for Milton’s poetry in the last seventy-five 
years has sprung from a dislike of Milton the man.” Brooks warned about the dangers of 
portraying Milton’s ideas in the context of literary criticism, asserting that, “though 
Milton’s ideas are important—Paradise Lost is not just a superb organ music throbbing 
in an intellectual void—still, our concern for this theological and philosophical 
consistency can push us into ruinous distortions of his poetry” (173).  While Brooks’ 
New Critical method has been challenged by Rajan and Fish, among others, his 
distinction between Milton the thoughtful poet and the Milton the prose thinker reflects a 
healthy respect for the complexity of the author’s body of work.  What Rumrich, 
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employing a now-familiar qualification, refers to as “Fish’s version of the author of 
Paradise Lost” (“Uninventing” 250), is thoroughly Fish’s creation.  There is no 
dichotomy between the text and the ideology Fish ascribes to Milton; the author’s 
personality is present in every dramatic situation and clever linguistic trap.  However, 
Fish places the onus of properly valuing Milton and his work upon the reader.  Fish’s 
Milton challenges the reader to both recognize and transcend the limits of individual 
(subjective) human perspective. 
While the meaning or literary-critical significance of Surprised by Sin cannot be 
wholly determined through Fish’s own body of work, his theoretical stances illumine the 
strategy implicit in his early criticism.  For instance, in his article, “Short People Got No 
Reason to Live: Reading Irony,” Fish answers Wayne Booth’s “distress” at “an infinite 
regress of unstable interpretations” in determining “literal and ironic meanings.” 
Concluding his argument, Fish contends that “rational debate” is possible only through 
historical context—filtered through a shifting “structure of assumptions and beliefs” 
(196).  Characteristically and here in step with poststructuralist theorists, Fish sees in this 
uncertainty infinite possibility, a “reassuring sequence in which one set of obvious and 
indisputable facts gives way to another” (196).  What Rumrich refers to as Fish’s 
“destabilizing hermeneutics” in Surprised by Sin enables Fish both to challenge New 
Critical taboos (which preclude locating textual meaning in either author or reader) and 
effectively to follow New Critical practice by asserting his (subjective) perspective on 
Paradise Lost in objective terminology, employing a “language of appropriation” that 
challenges its own readers with an absolutist assertion (safe from general criticism in its 
theoretical subjectivity). 
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As I have discussed, through his essentially orthodox Christian approach, Fish 
fashions a logocentric Milton similar to the Milton outlined in Bloom’s Anxiety of 
Influence.  Although Bloom does not affirm Milton’s Christian orthodoxy (a task often 
attributed to Fish), like Fish he asserts Milton’s logocentric resistance to the “anxieties” 
of modern authorship.  In his reading, posited like Fish’s for the approval of his 
interpretive community, Bloom affirms a similar Milton, writing that 
To Milton, all fallen experience had its inevitable foundation in loss, and 
paradise could be regained only by One Greater Man, and not by any poet 
whatsoever….  Milton—as both Johnson and Hazlitt emphasize16—was 
incapable of suffering the anxiety of influence, unlike all of his 
descendents. (34) 
 
For many of Fish’s readers he has conveyed his subject with such conviction that it 
almost seems that the author knows—indeed, becomes—the poet himself.  In the manner 
of Bloom’s strong critic,17 he has taken and (perhaps mis-) read Milton, ultimately 
seeming to identify personally with the author-forbearer in his own work.   
If Milton designs Paradise Lost to educate its reader towards an improved 
interpretation, then Surprised by Sin effectively performs a similar task, teaching the 
reader how to interpret the poem that will then teach the reader how to interpret itself.  
The Anxiety of Influence, published six years later, relates to Surprised by Sin directly; for 
both works, Milton is a prominent subject.  Bloom’s theory offers an interesting comment 
on the nature of Fish’s central subject and bearer of meaning—the reader.  In his 
“Interchapter,” Bloom asserts that “we deny that there is, was or ever can be a poet as 
                                                          
16 Bloom cites Johnson’s emphasis that Milton “did not refuse admission to the thought or images of his 
predecessors, but he did not seek them.” (Anxiety, 34). 
17 Though he is a “deliberate revisionist” to Freud’s emphases, Bloom maintains that a “family romance” 
underlies all of poetic history.  The struggle to become one’s poetic father, to attain Viconian “priority in 
the natural order and authority in the spiritual order,” characterizes the history of poetry after Shakespeare, 
when the “flood” of anxiety swamped poetic (and critical) consciousness (11).   
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poet—to a reader.  Just as we can never embrace (sexually or otherwise) a single person, 
but embrace the whole of his or her family romance, so we can never read a poet without 
reading the whole of his or her family romance as poet” (94).  While Bloom’s modified 
Freudian emphasis is of limited use here, it provides an interesting gloss on Fish’s 
assertion of Milton’s authorial intention.   
In writing Surprised by Sin, Fish participates to some degree in what Bloom 
depicts as a “family romance” of literary relations.  To the extent that Fish is accepted or 
seen as a force to be reckoned with among other Milton critics, he becomes a new father 
figure, as well as a “covering cherub” for Milton scholarship. “All criticisms,” Bloom 
writes,  
that call themselves primary vacillate between tautology—in 
which the poem is and means itself—and reduction—in which the poem 
means something that is not itself a poem.  Antithetical criticism must 
begin by denying both tautology and reduction, a denial best delivered by 
the assertion that the meaning of a poem can only be a poem, but another 
poem—a poem not itself. (70)   
 
To the extent that Fish follows the model of antithetical criticism, he follows it in a 
practical manner: in Bloom’s terms, Surprised by Sin could be interpreted as a poem 
itself, incorporating and subsuming the original into its own order.  For, to Bloom, 
“Critics are more or less valuable than other critics only (precisely) as poets are more or 
less valuable than other poets.  For just as a poet must be found by the opening in a 
precursor poet, so must the critic” (95).   
Stanley Fish, in Bloom’s terms, might be “found by the (poststructural) opening” 
in John Milton (95).  Indeed, Bloom’s theory represents both a comparison with and a 
commentary upon Fish’s own critical-theoretical stance.  “Poetry,” Bloom writes, “is the 
anxiety of influence, is misprision, is a disciplined perverseness.  Poetry is 
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misunderstanding, misinterpretation, misalliance” (94).  Patterns of Fish’s critical 
reception indicate that, although many align themselves implicitly or explicitly with 
Fish’s reading, there are a good number of critics who maintain that Fish has in fact 
misunderstood, misinterpreted Milton.  Some critics, in fact, complain about the stasis, 
the lack of energy that Surprised by Sin has inflicted on Milton studies. “Influence is 
Influenza—an astral disease,” Bloom asserts.  “If influence were health, who could write 
a poem?  Health is stasis” (95).  Indeed, Rumrich contends that Milton criticism after 
Fish has become far too healthy, comparing it to the unquestioning embracing of 
assumptions necessary for “normal science.”  For Rumrich and other critics, the stability 
he posits is artificial and deadly for interpretation of Milton’s poetry.  
(ii) FISH’S GOD: SUBSTITUTING THE SOURCE 
 
  The overshadowing and underlying presence of what Fish calls the “monist” deity 
of his Milton contextualizes all overt (Fish might use the term, “superficial”) patterns of 
conflict, as opposed, of course, to the pleasant interrelations of harmony provided by this 
God.18  As I have discussed above, before the time of Surprised by Sin, critical debates 
around Paradise Lost reflected a strong emphasis on ideological and theological 
interests.19  The orthodox Christian Milton which Fish appropriates, reformulates, and in 
part helps to establish, occupies a unique place in the context of several historically 
                                                          
18 William Kolbrener presents a fascinating discussion of the problems of monistic and dualistic readings in 
Milton’s Warring Angels (Cambridge University Press, 1997); however, apart from the elaborate 
construction of Kolbrener’s historiography, I find that though this term bears complex and misleading 
associations (one possible interpretation of monism might be associated with Manichaeism; in another 
interpretation I have heard that it bears connotations of pantheism), in the context of Fish’s usage this 
simply and effectively refers to the unifying theme of God’s sustaining presence (as opposed to the 
theological view of God’s necessary and limiting or limited union with manifested creation). 
19 For a revealing discussion of the ideological debates of the earlier part of the twentieth century, see Carl 
Freedman, “How To Do Things With Milton: A Study in the Politics of Literary Criticism,” in Critical 
Essays on John Milton, ed. Christopher Kendrick (1995), 19-46.  Also see Christopher Kendrick’s 
introductory essay to the same collection.  As I have mentioned earlier, Patrick Murray presents a definitive 
consideration of the “Milton Controversy” in Milton: The Modern Phase. 
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oriented comparisons between religion and literature.  Marxist critic Terry Eagleton 
observes from his historical view that, since the Victorian period, “As religion 
progressively ceases to provide…affective values and basic mythologies by which a 
socially turbulent class-society can be welded together, ‘English’ is constructed as a 
subject to carry this ideological burden” (21).  “The failure of religion,” Eagleton writes, 
not to mention the declared death of God (the advent of the modern perspective), required 
a more effective alternative (21).  Critics from Matthew Arnold to Northrop Frye have 
attempted to endow literature with the mythic value of religion, engaging with what 
Eagleton calls the “deep-seated a-rational fears and needs” common to humankind (20).   
At this point, an opposition develops within literature between the objective, 
doctrinal voice represented by Milton’s God and the subjective, heretical voice of Satan.  
“Literature from Arnold onwards,” writes Eagleton, becomes “the enemy of ‘ideological 
dogma,’ an attitude which might have come as a surprise” to John Milton (22-23).  
Indeed, theorists with evident ideological impulses like Eliot and Leavis attempted to 
effectively forget Milton.  Likewise, Arnold, according to Eagleton, tried “to dissolve 
away the embarrassingly doctrinal bits of Christianity into poetically suggestive 
sonorities” (23).  In a feminist consideration of Milton’s literary significance, aligned 
with feminist challenges to the anointed literary canon, Christine Froula writes, consistent 
with Eagleton’s evaluation, that “Since Matthew Arnold, the institution of literature has 
been described in terms which liken its authority to that of religion, not only by 
outsiders—Woolf’s woman ‘divining the priest’—but by insiders who continue to 
employ the stances and language of religious authority” (324).  Using early Christian 
religious controversies as an allegory, Froula sees parallels in the modern literary 
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institution.  Fish’s Milton of course employs the metaphysically imposing “stances and 
language” of this authority, an observation not lost upon his critics, including Rumrich.20  
Indeed, in spite of or because of its theoretical qualification, Fish’s reading, restores the 
full metaphysical significance to Milton’s poetry.  Fish conveys this metaphysical unity 
(which almost seems here to transcend the poetry and govern the universe) in an 
assertively worded statement of apologetics for his version of Milton’s deity, Fish writes 
that  
The fact that those who seek to escape God’s sphere (to impair him) are 
repeatedly reclaimed and brought back within it (they never really left) 
does not mean that the act of containment is either illegitimate or 
unsuccessful; it means only that the structure of the poem and the structure 
of the universe is such that all free creatures—angels, men, women, 
readers—have many more ways to go wrong than go right, and that when 
they do go wrong, the safety net of a fortunate universe, presided over by a 
God who can bring good out of evil, will always be there to catch them 
whether they welcome it or not. (lxvi-lxvii) 
 
Fish reads a God that to his Milton is fundamentally and necessarily good, desiring only 
good for his creatures.  The qualification, “whether they welcome it or not” is the key of 
perspective.  The reader can inhabit Milton’s universe, he implies, but there are 
consequences for perspectival inflexibility. 
Fish’s God also represents an interesting phenomenon in the context of the post-
structuralist theory which he in part draws upon.  Where, as Eagleton contends, English 
literary studies had begun to assume the ideological function of a substitute Christianity, 
Foucault and Derrida respond to the ideological risks of the modern literary institution by 
attempting to free the literary discourse from limiting metaphysical constructs.  Where 
Fish’s work restores a conception of doctrinal, non-literary Christianity, both theorists 
                                                          
20 For an interesting feminist literary application of “Gnostic” interpretation, see for instance Froula, “When 
Eve Reads Milton: Undoing the Canonical Economy,” Critical Inquiry 10 (December 1983): 321-45.   
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advocate a system of substitution and suspension of metaphysical certainty.  Post-
structuralist theory focuses on decentering, while Fish’s Milton is overwhelmingly 
centered.  For Derrida and Foucault, varying substitutes can provide the “center” of 
discourse; the concept of “subject” or author is hopefully complex and uncertain.  For 
both theorists, antagonistic language must be employed in the same world which requires 
the author-function. 
In his essay, “What Is an Author,” Michel Foucault focuses on the decentering of 
the “privileged position of the author,” noting the similarities between St. Jerome’s 
Christian exegetical concept of author and that of modern literary religion (151).  “We 
are accustomed,” writes Foucault, recalling the assertive power of Fish’s God, “to saying 
that the author is the genial creator of a work in which he deposits, with infinite wealth 
and generosity, an inexhaustible world of significations” (145).  Advocating multiplicity, 
as opposed to the monism of Fish’s Milton, Foucault writes that “We are used to thinking 
that as soon as [the author] speaks, meaning begins to proliferate indefinitely” (146).  In 
fact, Foucault writes, the author stands as an ideological bulwark against such a 
“proliferation of meaning” (146).  In what amounts to an attack on the literary religion 
championed by Arnold, Frye, and the New Critics, Foucault asserts that “Giving writing a 
primal status seems to be a way of retranslating, in transcendental terms, both the 
theological affirmation of its sacred character and the critical affirmation of its creative 
character” (147).  Eagleton echoes the observations of Foucault, noting that the “ultimate 
truths” of religion, “like those mediated by the literary symbol, are conveniently closed to 
rational demonstration, and thus absolute in their claims” (20).  Beyond opposition, 
Foucault continues, “It is not enough…to repeat the empty assertion that the author has 
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disappeared…we must locate the space left empty by the author’s disappearance, follow 
the distribution of gaps and breaches, and watch for the openings that this disappearance 
uncovers” (144).  Once one has moved beyond a preoccupation with the author-function, 
one can focus on the discourse itself, while questions of subject-functions sink to a 
background murmur.   
Beyond the problems of the author-function, Derrida explores the origins of this 
theoretical language, asserting that a historical “rupture” occurred when “the structurality 
of structure had to begin to be thought” (878).  Fish fills the space of this rupture with his 
own structural substitution.  After this historic rift, Derrida writes, metaphysical 
certainties began to erode; “it was probably necessary to begin to think that there was no 
center, that the center could not be thought in the form of a being-present…had no natural 
locus, that it was not a fixed locus but a function, a sort of non-locus in which an infinite 
number of sign-substitutions came into play” (879).  Fish’s Milton, however, defines this 
swirling “siege of contraries” in opposition to a metaphysical center.  At the moment of 
antagonism, Derrida writes,  
language invades the universal problematic; that in which, in the 
absence of a center or origin, everything became discourse—provided we 
can agree on this word—that is to say, when everything became a system 
where the central signified, the original or transcendental signified, is 
never absolutely present outside a system of differences.  The absence of 
the transcendental signified extends the domain and the interplay of 
signification ad infinitum.  (879) 
 
This de-centering “maintained its most radical formulation,” Derrida writes, under the 
deconstructive discourses of Nietzsche, Freud and Heidegger (880).  Where these 
theorists embrace the opposite of his faith, Fish’s Milton affirms the pervasiveness of a 
“transcendental signified.”  Derrida confirms the tension between deconstruction and 
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Fish’s own critical project, writing that “we cannot utter a single destructive proposition 
which has not already slipped into the form, the logic, and the implicit postulations of 
precisely what it seeks to contest” (880).  As Fish observes in his 1997 preface, one 
cannot challenge his “structure of thought” from within; rather, the critic must challenge 
the entire structure, substituting an alternate center.  Derrida writes, seeking to engender 
consciousness of these binary oppositions, “we cannot give up this metaphysical 
complicity without also giving up the critique we are directing against this complicity” 
(880).  Fish contends that the critic cannot challenge his thesis, as Rumrich attempts, on 
its terms.  She must set her own terms of interpretation as Fish has done. 
Throughout the progression of his argument, Fish heavily stresses the singular 
Christian focus of Paradise Lost.  Fish’s Milton writes in order to lead his readers to 
perceive the truth of a unified, living divine deity.  Milton’s purpose, Fish says, “differ[s] 
little from that of so many devotional writers, ‘to discover to us our miserable and 
wretched estate through corruption of nature’ and to ‘shew how a man may come to a 
holy reformation and so happily recover himself’ (Richard Bernard, The Isle of Man)” 
(ix).  Further articulating his intentionalist thesis, Fish continues that “what Milton 
describes in the Areopagitica—the piecing together of the shattered image of truth—is no 
more than this, the recovery of the unified moral vision of Edenic innocence; and it is the 
task he sets the reader in [Paradise Lost]” (160).  Fish’s characterization shapes a self-
assertive author who remains conscious of his theoretical foundations in Christianity.  “In 
Milton’s monistic universe,” Fish contends, “where ‘all things are of God’ (de deo), a sin 
against the source is a sin against all” (159).   
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For Fish’s Milton, problems such as politics, history, and race are subsumed in a 
Christian context of the individual’s (really, the reader’s) relationship to the Father: 
A proper sense of one’s relationship to God will yield a proper attitude 
toward everything that flows from him, since all relationships and the 
values embodied in them depend on his sustaining power.  To turn away 
from God is to turn away from all values and to default on all obligations, 
whether they be racial, political or familial. (159).   
 
In Milton’s monistic universe, writes Fish, “faith, discipline, obedience—they are one, 
along with heroism and love; and none of them can be invoked to sanction a movement 
away from God” (159).  Fish continues that, “While the moral structure of the universe—
its radical unity—survives the Fall, man’s ability to perceive it does not.  The impairment 
of his vision is reflected in the nature of the acts he is required to perform” (159).  
Prelapsarian Adam and Eve “discharge their obligations to all derivative forms, keeping 
the whole law by keeping one point of it (which is the law).  But fallen man must keep 
every point in order to fulfill one.”   
We the fallen readers must allow ourselves to be led from shadowy types of 
worldly politics to recognize the truth of God’s pervasive plan.  The goal of Fish’s 
Paradise Lost is the cultivation of virtue, living according to God’s plan.  The limitations 
of his fallen perspective stem from a single, all-encompassing act of disobedience—
eating the fruit of one tree:  
In the Fall, the issue is confused when alternative considerations are 
created (i.e., Eve’s welfare) and as punishment this momentary confusion 
becomes part of man’s intellectual equipment.  That is to say, he is no 
longer able to see the oneness of God’s law and is delivered to the Mosaic 
law, the perfect reflection of his divided vision. (160) 
 
The historic progression of the scheme of Fish’s Milton moves from the multiplicity of 
law to the unity embodied in Jesus Christ.  In the mainstream Christian literary canon, the 
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gospel of John proclaims the advent of a transcendent origin, bearer of meaning, and 
unifier—an embodied Logos.  John writes, “In the beginning was the Word, and the 
Word was with God, and the Word was God...And the Word was made flesh, and dwelt 
among us.”21  This union of signifier and signified is restored through the person of a 
transcendent Logos; as Fish writes, “Those who accept Christ live again in prelapsarian 
freedom because they fulfill the entire law through the single decision to believe that he 
has redeemed them; this belief is the belief Adam and Eve evidence as long as they do 
not eat” (160).  This tenet underlies centuries of Christian doctrine and moral and social 
guidelines, centered on the person, author, and subject, Jesus Christ.  While Fish 
embraces a destabilizing reader-centric theory, he does not employ it to suspend a 
metaphysical tradition but to substitute his own version of that tradition, a version which 
does (as Wittreich has pointed out) exhibit a patriarchal emphasis.  For Fish’s Milton, 
Derrida’s “absence of the transcendental signified” becomes realigned with the 
metaphysical certainty that Derrida so emphatically withdraws.  As Rumrich observes, 
“In what is becoming a familiar irony, Surprised by Sin…accomplished the theoretical 
liberation of Milton studies by placing a destabilizing hermeneutics in the service of 
conservative ideology” (250).  Instead of following the methods of Foucault and Derrida 
in the advent of theoretically conscious criticism, many Miltonists have turned to Fish, 
who unites his historically conscious approach with a method of “theoretical liberation.”  
It is Fish’s eloquent consideration of the author’s faith, of his metaphysical certainty (as 
opposed to doctrinal loyalty), that continues to attract new generations of adherents. 
                                                          
21 John 1:1-14, KJV (King James Version) 
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CHAPTER 4 
CONCLUSION: FISH’S “GRAND STYLE”  
For more than a quarter-century, Stanley Fish’s Surprised by Sin helped define 
both positively and negatively the methods of the Miltonists who engaged his work.  The 
direct influence of Fish’s thesis, however, is not evident in the writing of every major 
Miltonist.  The work of J. Max Patrick, C.A. Patrides, and Northrop Frye, to name a few 
prominent critics, has not reflected any explicit influence or dramatic methodical 
alteration directly attributable to Surprised by Sin.  Balachandra Rajan, a relative 
contemporary of Fish’s, incidentally acknowledges similarities of thought without 
expressing either debt or anxiety.22  Indeed, without the recurring outcry of reviewers and 
critics Fish’s work might seem incidental to the larger pursuits of Milton critics.  Often, 
as Rumrich has observed, Fish’s influence is reflected in subtle critical tactics such as 
Kerrigan’s masking his underlying critique with a gesture of apparent deference.   
The pervasive power of Fish’s reading follows, as I have discussed, from his 
assertion of an objective system of metaphysics, presided over by a sustaining deity, 
whom the characters in the poem (and therefore it is assumed, the readers of the poem) 
cannot reject without experiencing dissatisfaction.  Indeed, Fish’s substitution of Milton’s 
God as textual center conveys such force that critics, Fish writes,  
often assume that it is my ambition to be the third in an unholy 
trinity: God surrounds and circumscribes the motions of his creatures; 
Milton wants to surround and circumscribe the motions of his readers; and 
Fish tries to surround and circumscribe the motions of all those who study 
and teach the work of Milton. (Surprised xii) 
 
                                                          
22 See above, Chapter 2, Section i. 
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Elaborating on this aspect of Fish’s influence in a special 1977 issue of Genre, Susan 
Horton highlights some interesting similarities between the rhetorical strategies Fish 
attributes to Milton and the strategies of Fish’s own writing.   
If we… begin with the assumption that any piece of criticism contains not 
only a critical strategy aimed at a text, but also a strategy calculated to 
‘entrap’ the reader of that criticism, and if, as Fish’s basic assumption has 
it, literary language is best seen as strategies directed towards readers 
rather than as language intended to communicate information, we ought to 
begin by seeing Fish’s style as strategy rather than as communication.  
Seen in this way, Fish’s ‘What we have here is…’ is easy to explain.  It is 
a calculated attempt to obscure the fact that what we have here is not, 
necessarily, or only, what he says at all.  Any interpretive strategy other 
than Fish’s own would necessarily yield a different predicate nominative 
after that is.  Fish knows this is so.  As he says in his essay in the Modern 
Language Notes ‘Responsibilities of the Critic’ volume, ‘Declaratives 
create the conditions to which they refer.’ (445) 
 
The declarative effects of Fish’s language that Horton describes provide an interesting 
comment on the critical significance of Surprised by Sin.  Within the relativity of critical 
opinion, Fish’s work represents a seeming contradiction, asserting subjectivity and 
practicing objective, literary-positivistic criticism.  Fish’s profession that meaning is 
subjective and “experiential” provides the basis for his confident assertions of textual and 
authorial authority, fashioning a personal Milton and Paradise Lost in objective 
language.  “One can almost see the accompanying hand gesture,” Horton writes, “the 
gesture of the creator.  Whoosh, and out of nothing there is—if not light, at least a new 
theory of a new interpretation or a new assertion about the nature and function of 
criticism” (445-46).”23   
                                                          
23 Since Horton’s commentary is not in the context of a work of Milton criticism or a direct response to the 
influence of Surprised by Sin, I do not include it among my representation of such responses (Chapter 2).  
Horton’s article represents a consideration of Fish’s style in general, which includes but is not specifically 
focused on the style of Surprised by Sin.   
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In the context of Horton’s valuation, Fish seems to acquire the poetic function 
Bloom ascribes to Milton’s Romantic descendents.  Bloom claims that,  
In departing from the unitary aspiration of his own youth Milton may be 
said to have fathered the poetry that we call post-Enlightenment or 
Romantic, the poetry that takes as its obsessive theme the power of the 
mind over the universe of death, or as Wordsworth phrased it, to what 
extent the mind is lord and master, outward sense the servant of her will. 
(34-35) 
 
The Romantic poetry Bloom describes defines itself by appropriating Milton’s poetry, 
assuming the poetic authority of Milton.  In a similar manner, Kolbrener contends, a 
complicated tradition of Milton criticism has appropriated Milton’s text.   The Fish 
described by Horton, who declares that “declaratives create the conditions to which they 
refer,” shares what Bloom terms the “post-Enlightenment” view of the mind’s mastery 
over the outward sense, perception, or interpretation. 
Fish’s critical relationship with Milton has dramatically influenced the direction 
of Milton studies.  Through introductory or prefatory expressions of method, critics over 
the course of almost four decades, from various schools of thought, have expressed the 
shaping presence of Fish’s application of theory, Surprised by Sin.  This work helped 
establish grounds for producing future criticism by averting unproductive ideologically 
based disagreements.  Whether or not one agrees with Fish’s interpretation, few critics 
have found such opportunity and success as he.  The institutional recognition of 
Surprised by Sin among Milton scholars is undeniable; the work’s lasting influence, 
however, is difficult to measure (its continuing recognition from the Milton Society is 
one significant way).  Brilliant and insightful works have been, and no doubt will be, 
published without reference to Fish’s thesis.  However, with the recent reprinting of the 
second edition, along with an extensive preface answering and anticipating critical 
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attacks, Stanley Fish’s initial experiment seems geared to challenge another generation of 
critics.  While I have theorized about the influence of Surprised by Sin, the best any critic 
can do in this context is to stress suggestive parallels and trends of thought.  The task of 
my critical survey, distinct from Kolbrener’s framework of “Whig history” and 
Rumrich’s challenge to Fish’s “structure of thought,” has been to outline trends of 
reception in the criticism of Surprised by Sin, arriving at a clearer conception of the 
nature of Fish’s success and the theoretical significance of his masterwork of Milton 
criticism.  The theory of Bloom, though limited, provides a valuable point-of-reference 
for my study, both as a commentary upon and in comparison with Fish’s theoretical 
strategy. 
In large part, the success of Fish in the twentieth century lies in his sophisticated 
post-Lewis exposition of and apologetics for Milton’s Christianity which in Fish’s 
Paradise Lost is essentially orthodox.  Though Fish’s critical and theoretical writings 
appear incompatible to many critics,24 the poststructural aspects of his later theory do not 
preclude his manner of practicing criticism.  The evaluation that textual meaning is 
indeterminate, as I have discussed earlier, allows for “infinite substitution.”  For Fish the 
Christian reader does exactly what the shrewd literary theorist would do: declare faith, 
and by declaring that faith, set the terms for experiencing the world.   
For Milton’s Satan, in Fish’s terms, this act of substitution (profession of faith) 
results in misery because his faith is misplaced—his “declarative” creates the condition to 
which it refers, even if that condition is unpleasant.  One sees what one chooses to see, 
and Satan chooses to see a world of self-creation ex-nihilo.  The practical consequences 
                                                          
 
24 See for instance, Edward T. Oakes, “Stanley Fish’s Milton,” First Things 117 (November 2001), 23-34.   
   
69 
of this choice are disastrous in Milton’s cosmos, as seen by Fish, because though literary 
expression creates meaning, meaning itself exists only in the mind.  A declarative, thus, 
cannot pave a pothole.  Satan says that God is impaired, and what subjectively he means 
is that he has taken something substantially away from God.  However, Satan’s meaning 
constantly inverts.  Like Stanley Fish’s declaratives, when Satan asserts, “The mind is its 
own place, and in itself / Can make a Heav’n of Hell, a Hell of Heav’n” (Paradise Lost 
1.254-55), there is a double-meaning.  Romantic readers would interpret this as a positive 
assertion, viewing the speaker as credible and the narrator as unbelievable.  In Fish’s 
interpretation, this assertion is a double-edged sword.  The mind’s declaration of faith 
creates the terms of existence, and as Fish emphasizes, this “textual truth” is directly 
linked to experience.  When Satan declares faith in himself as source of his own life, 
originator of his own good (soon to be dubbed evil), “self-begot, self-raised, / By [his] 
own quick’ning power” (5.860-61), Fish’s reader sees that his vaunted profession of faith 
leads him to inward pain—again, the surprise of sin.   
As the reader, Fish contends, your mind is the setting of Paradise Lost, and the 
experience which creates the poem for you is thus always valid; however, in bringing 
your modern perspective to the poem, you may not like what you see (or experience).  In 
theory (in my mind, Satan’s mind, Empson’s mind), every substitution is conceivable; in 
application, however, the results will vary, as will the success of your posited critical 
interpretations of Milton.  Fish’s explicit stance against empirical criticism, further 
articulated in his 1997 preface, follows from this view.  As Derrida emphasizes, one can 
never escape the terms of the discourse one wishes to critique; nor can one criticize 
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Milton without addressing the terms of Christianity in some form.  In short, you as a 
critical reader may be surprised by your own sin.   
Though this experience might not appeal to every modern critic, as Fish observes 
in his 1997 preface, the influence of his work is measured largely in its use among his 
colleagues.  Thus, Fish notes with satisfaction the positive response he has received from 
teachers who found that “Surprised by Sin made it possible for them to teach Paradise 
Lost to modern students” (xv).  To varying degrees, Fish’s work provides an influential 
tool for educators.  Indeed, the very nature of Fish’s Paradise Lost is pedagogical, and he 
emphasizes the importance of teaching with vigor.  “The imperative is ‘read’!” Fish 
writes, 
and by not giving up, by not closing the book, by accepting the 
challenge of self-criticism and self-knowledge, one learns how to read, 
and by extension how to live, and becomes finally the Christian hero who 
is, after all, the only fit reader.  In the end, the education of Milton’s 
reader, the identification of his hero, and the description of his style, that 
is, of its effects, are one. (207) 
 
Generous participation in Milton’s epic is its own reward, ennobling the reader.  Further, 
in constructing a plausible imaginative framework for his pedagogical poem, Fish ensures 
that worthy readers will keep returning to the original text, seeking the deeper meanings 
more than hinted in Fish’s subtle, deft analyses.   
In the end, literary critics who find significance in the writing of John Milton will 
doubtless continue to select the theories and methods most appropriate to their individual 
approaches.  Stanley Fish knows this and emphasizes his reliance on a critical acceptance 
which more than any empirical demonstration will “prove” him right.  There is 
imaginative value in Fish’s substitution, the grandeur of a “grand central” Christianity in 
the vein of C.S. Lewis reconstructed through the writings of Milton and his 
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contemporaries and based on a vastly complex but fundamentally simple assertion: 
Milton’s God, the God of the third book of Paradise Lost is (problematically, but 
emphatically) the author’s center.   
Critics who appreciate only the grand “organ music” of an age whose values are 
untranslatable might find Fish’s Milton less desirable.  Practically speaking, although 
there are relatively few critics who overtly dispute and refute the validity of Fish’s thesis; 
it is the ideological desirability, or lack thereof, which most affects the perpetuating 
acceptance of his work.  Critics and theorists resistant to the ideological tradition invoked 
by Fish, particularly Rumrich, find his work undesirable for the future practice of 
criticism.  Historically conscious approaches such as Marxist criticism may find Fish’s 
work compelling in its very employment of ideology, just as Milton has been the subject 
of similar analyses.  Far from a distant archeological artifact, however, Surprised by Sin 
remains vital among Milton critics.  The powerful influence of Fish’s work endures in the 
recurring revival of critical response, of adherence, transumption, challenge, and 
refocusing.  Like the writing of John Milton, Fish’s masterwork continues to incite 
visceral reactions, positive and negative, challenging and invigorating the core beliefs of 
its readers.  Indeed, it sometimes seems the ideological debates that once centered on 
Milton now find their focus in Fish.  Stanley Fish has instituted his version of Milton and 
Milton’s epic, and after almost four decades, Surprised by Sin remains a force that 
demands reckoning. 
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